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TRENDS IN FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CLIFFORD

C.

ALLOWAY* AND RICHARD

B.

KNIGHT* *

INTRODUCTION

The following outline generally illustrates the materials discussed in
the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Surveys of Florida constitutional law.
Subjects followed by an asterisk (*) have been transferred, in whole or in
part, to other authors in the Fifth Florida Law Survey. Subjects followed
by two asterisks (**) have not been discussed, since the decisions did not
reflect significant changes.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
I.
II.

III.
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LEGISLATIVE POWER PROBLEMS
EXECUTIVE POWER
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INTEREST

III.
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IV.
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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
1.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

II. CLARITY
III.

PRESUMPTIONS

IV.

CIVIL COURTS*
CRIMINAL COURTS*

V.

EQUAL PROTECTION
I.

II.

RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS

OTHER PROBLEMS IN EQUAL PROTECTION

LEGISLATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
I. ARTICLE III, SECTION 16
II.

ARTICLE

III,

SECTION 20

III. ARTICLE III, SECTION 21
CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS*
BOND FINANCING*
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT*
AMENDING PROCESSES**
FALLS FROM CONSTITUTIONAL GRACE

The present article analyzes selected decisions disposing of Florida
constitutional issues; Florida court interpretation of United States constitutional law is generally' omitted. Volumes 113 through 131, Southern
Reporter, second series, mark the limits of research. Selected books, articles
and decisions from other states are incorporated in appropriate footnotes for
the convenience of the reader who desires more depth in a particular
subject matter.
In the 1960 general election the voters amended our state constitution
2
in several particulars.

1. Unless Florida courts treat federal court decisions, interpreting the federal instruor highly persuasive on Florida court interpretation of the Florida instrument. The most dramatic example of this involves the freedoms of speech, press, assembly
and religion, protected in both instruments.
2. Selected items: FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5, art. VI, § 2, art. XVI.

ment, as binding
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SEPARATION OF POWERS

This section will be organized, as are the Florida decisions, into the
3
traditional fields of power.

II.

LEGISLATIVE POWER PROBLEMS

A. Exclusive Legislative Power
The Florida Supreme Court again stated that the legislature may not
delegate the power to enact a law, or to declare what the law shall be, or
to exercise an unrestricted discretion in applying a law. What the legislature may do is to enact a law complete in itself, designed to accomplish
a general public purpose, which may expressly authorize designated officials
within definite limitations to provide regulations for the operation and
enforcement of the law.4 The legislature had adopted a map and plat law
which stated that the act should affect only such county commission
districts in Volusia County as the Board of County Commissioners determined advisable. The court held that the Board had power to activate the
map and plat law as to part or all of the districts in the county. The
Board was not exercising exclusive legislative power.
According to the court the legislative language did no more than
authorize the Board to "exercise its discretion as to time of executing the
act which must be done pursuant to the provisions thereof." Although the
Board had power under the act to make it apply or not, as to part or all
of the districts in the county, the court's position was that the Board was
not acting as a legislature.,
B. Legislative Establishment of Standards
Again" the court required that the legislature, in order to enact a
valid delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency, must
fix adequate standards to guide the actions of the administrative agency.
This requirement is in line with the general law in the United States on

3. FLA. CONST. art. II divides the total Florida governmental power "into three
departments" (legislative, executive and judicial). Perhaps the most illuminating article on
the problems inherent in attempts to sharply define exclusive functions is Jaffee, An Essay
on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1947).
4. Stewart v. Stone, 130 So.2d 577, 579 (Fla. 1961). Also in issue in the case were
the parallel problems of delegation of legislative power, FLA. CONSr. art. III, § 20, and
substantive due process.
5. The decision is in line with modern cases. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1
(1939). An excellent state decision relating the techniques of determining which departments should exercise particular functions is Trustees of Village of Saratoga Springs v.
Saratoga Gas., Elec. Light & Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 83 N.E. 693 (1908).
6. See, e.g., Diamond Cab Owners Ass'n v. Florida R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n,

66 So.2d 593, 596 (Fla. 1953).
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the subject.' The purpose of the rule is to ensure that the administrative
agency will follow the guide-lines established by the legislature. A second
beneficial effect from the requirement is that a respondent, who is
regulated by the agency, will be able to determine whether or not the
agency is acting within the scope of granted legislative power.
In Husband v. Cassel,8 the plaintiff, whose vocational pursuit was
that of a "psychologist," brought suit in a declaratory action against the
Florida State Board of Examiners of Psychology. The Board threatened
plaintiff with criminal prosecution if he used the title "Psychologist" when
he had not been issued a certificate entitling him to do so by the Board
under Florida statutes. The court believed that the only limitation imposed
upon the Board was that the examination to be given by the Board must
be in the field of psychology. The legislature had failed to properly define
standards to guide the Board's discretion. Therefore, the Board had
complete discretion to determine the nature and scope of the field to
be encompassed in the examination which determined the applicant's
qualifications as a psychologist. 10
C. Delegation of Legislative Power Must Be Clear
The Florida Constitution, article IV, section 30, states that the
Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission is granted the
"management, restoration, conservation and regulation" of the "birds,
game, fur-bearing animals, and fresh water fish of the State." Among other
powers granted to the Commission by this section are the powers to
regulate the manner and method of "taking, transporting, storing and
using birds, game, fur-bearing animals, fresh water fish, reptiles, and
amphibians." In Barrow v. Holland," the plaintiff, an operator of a
wild life exhibit which was maintained as a tourist attraction, sued for a
declaratory decree and an injunction against the closing of his business
by the Commission. The court apparently held that the constitutional
terminology did not grant the Commission power to regulate wild animals

7. Jaffee, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLUNI. L. REv. 561
(1947) (state practice also). One still finds the improper delegation issue argued in the
federal courts (see United States v. Lauer, 287 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 82 Sup.
Ct. 34 (1961), but not successfully argued.
8. 130 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1961). At issue was FLA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (legislative
power). 9. FLA. STAT. § 490.041 (1961) provides that before the Board may issue a
certificate to one as a Psychologist, the Board shall require the applicant to "pass a representative assembled written, and an oral or practical examination in psychology or both
...oral and practical examinations .... " The Board is empowered to "rate the applicant
and its decision is final in any examination."
10. Accord, State v. Dade County, 120 So.2d 625, 627 (Fla. App. 1960), cert.
quashed, 126 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1961).
11. 125 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1960). Also at issue were clarity requirements for agency
rules and substantive due process (dictum).
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been brought within confinement through private ownership. Since the
which have been removed from their natural condition and which have
language could easily be read as granting such power to the Commission,
it is obvious that the Florida court is demanding a very clear grant of
12
power to an administrative agency over a particular subject matter.
D. Clarity of a Regulation of a State Administrative Agency
The court has consistently required that regulations of a state agency
must be clear. In Barrow v. Holland,13 the Florida Game and Fresh Water
Fish Commission promulgated Commission Rule 6.14 No other rule of
the Commission indicated to persons desiring a permit what they would
have to do in order to obtain one. The only stated requirement imposed
upon a person was that he satisfy the Director of the Commission. The
Director, acting through his inspector, had absolute discretionary power
to decide who would and who would not be granted a permit. The court
5
struck down the rule.1
E. Delegation of Legislative Power to the National Government
In National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Odham,'6 the Florida Milk Commission issued the following order: "For all Class II Milk delivered by
producers during any period in excess of five per cent (5%) of the volume
of Class I Milk as defined by Official Order of the Florida Milk Commission the price per gallon shall be the price established each month
for Class IIMilk, pursuant to the Miami, Florida, Federal Milk Market12. But see Foremost Dairies v. Odham, 121 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1959) (Thomas,
C.J., dissenting). On rehearing, 121 So.2d 636, 639 (Fla. 1960) (Thomas, C.J., dissenting
and Terrell, J., adhering to original opinion), the original opinion was modified on a
statutory construction issue. Here the court more easily found a "necessarily inferred
power." One could distinguish these decisions on the basis that Barrow v. Holland, supra
note 11, involved a constitutional grant of power.
13. Supra note 11.
14. "The Director may issue permits giving the right to take or to be in possession
of wildlife or fresh water fish, or their nest of eggs, for scientific, educational, exhibition,
propagation or management purposes. Such permits shall be subject to such terms . . .
as may be prescribed by the Commission .... Traveling shows, zoos, or wildlife exhibits,
exhibiting wildlife and/or fresh water fish native to Florida, shall be required to secure a
permit before entering the State . . . .All such traveling shows, zoos or wildlife exhibits
shall be subject to inspection at all times by Wildlife Officers ...and failure to comply
with all requirements set out by the Commission, including mistreatment or neglect of such
animals, shall be cause for immediate cancellation of the permit issued for the operation of
the show or exhibit."
15. The basis of decision is either procedural due process clarity requirements or
clarity requirements under some separation of powers rationale.
16. 121 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1959). On rehearing, 121 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1960) (Thomas,
C.J., dissenting and Terrell, J., adhering to original opinion) the original opinion was
modified on a statutory construction issue. At issue in the case were FLA. CONST. DECL.
oF RIGHTS § 12 and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (substantive due process and procedural
due process) (hearing requirements, improper delegation and confiscation). Compare
National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Odham supra with Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197

So. 495 (1940).
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ing Order." The court chose not to treat this order as granting to the
Federal Government, through the federal administrator, the power to
determine milk prices for the Commission. Instead the court stated that
the monthly price "computed is ministerial and can be delegated." The
court was assisted by the fact that the order was limited to a single
federal order and had no reference to further orders or amendments. To
the court the fact that the order employed the terminology "shall be the
price established each month" was nothing more than "an element in
the application of the formula." In other words, the federal order was
"employed to reflect changes in the price of milk ingredients," not to
grant to federal authorities any facet of state power.
F. Delegation of Legislative Power to Private Individuals
The Florida Legislature enacted a statute 17 which provides that
"mineral, oil or other sub-surface rights, when owned in fee simple
separately from the ownership of the surface of the land" shall be
"taken and treated as real property and shall be subject to taxation
separate from the fee." The statute imposes the duty on the owner of
the severed sub-surface rights to return the same for taxation and if this
is not done by the owner thereof the duty to assess the severed sub-surface
rights for taxation is imposed upon the tax assessor. However, the
separate assessment by the assessor is required only when the owner of
some record interest in the land files with the tax assessor of the county
a written request for a separate assessment of these sub-surface rights.
To the court the effect of the statute was to vest in the owner of some
record interest in the surface of the land a discretion as to when the
authority to assess severcd sub-surface rights for ad valorem tax purposes
should be exercised. This was held to be an unauthorized delegation of
legislative power."'
G. Legislative Functions
The courts declared a number of functions and powers of the
legislature recently. These ranged over the following subject matters: (1)
the legislature has the power to exact from candidates for public office
reasonable fees; 19 (2) the constitution does not limit the power of the
17. FLA. STAT. § 193.221 (1961).
18. Cassady v. Consolidated Naval Stores Co., 119 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1960). At issue
therein were the following: improper delegation of legislative power; FLA. CONS'. art. IX,
§ 1 (uniform rate of taxation); FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (legislative delegation of power
to assess and impose taxes); equal protection (decision does not state which constitution
involved). On this subject see Jaffee, Law-Making by Private Groups, 51 HA1Rv. L. RLv.
201 (1937).
19. Bodner v. Cray, 129 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1961) (dictum). At issue were Fla.
CONST. art. V, § 13 (elegibility requirements for justices) and FLA. CoNs'r. DILCL. Or
Rici's § 12 (substantive due process) or the definition of a legislative function (regulation of elections).
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legislature to prescribe procedures for municipal courts;20 (3) it is a
legislative function to deprive a witness of his constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination by according him immunity; 21 (4) the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, which extends to state agents or employees, can
only be changed by constitutional amendment or by enactment of
legislation or by both;22 (5) where the constitution, as with qualifications
of electors for elections for municipal offices, does not confer the right
to vote or prescribe the qualifications of voters, the legislature may do
S0.

23

I11.

24

EXECUTIVE POWER

A. Limitation on Utilization of Advisory Opinions
In 1959, the court took a healthy step towards a reduction of its
advisory opinion function for the governor. 25 The governor requested the
opinion of the justices as to whether or not an act of the legislature
which sought to abolish the civil court of record for Duval County was
constitutional. If the act were invalid there existed a vacancy in the office
of the judge of this court. Assuming a vacancy, the governor wished to
know whether or not he could appoint and commission a successor
under Florida Constitution, article X, section 7, which details the governor's
appointment power.
A majority of the members of the court believed that the constitutionality of the statute should only be passed upon in an adversary
proceeding. The effect of this opinion should be to strictly channel the
advisory opinions of the court to construction of clauses of the constitution affecting the governor's executive powers and duties. 21
20. Boyd v. County of Dade, 123 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1960) (dictum) (Thomas, C.J.,
agreeing to conclusion and Hobson, J., not participating). At issue were FLA. CONST.
DECL. OF RiCHTS §§ 3, 11 (right to trial by jury); FLA. CONST. art V, § 4(2) (court jurisdiction) and Fi.A. CoNS-r. art. VIII, § 11 (Dade County home rule).
21. Brizzie v. State, 120 So.2d 27, 30 (Fla. App. 1960).
22. Buck v. McLean, 115 So.2d 764 (Fla. App. 1960) (dictum). At issue was
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 22 (suits against the state).
23. Hisgen v. Rileigh, 115 So.2d 715 (Fla. App. 1959) (dictum). At issue was
FiA. CONsTr. art. V, § 6 (qualifications of electors). It is difficult to state whether the
Florida courts, in the decisions related in this section, are declaring functions which are
properly legislative in nature under separation of powers-or whether the courts are construing particular constitutional language.
24. Included herein are several administrative law problems with a constitutional
flavor (see sections D, E and F).
25. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 113 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1959) (Thomas,
C.J., and Roberts, J., disagreeing with their colleagues Hobson, Drew, Thornal, and

O'Connell, J.J.).

26. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 13: "The Governor may, at any time, require the opinion
of the Justices of the Supreme Court, as to the interpretation of any portion of this Constitution upon any question affecting his Executive powers and duties, and the Justices
shall render such opinion in writing." An analysis of the proper limitations of the advisory opinion can be found in Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARv. L.
REv. 1002 (1924).
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B. The Veto Power of the Governor
In In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor,27 the governor explained to
the court in his letter requesting an opinion that the legislature had
conveyed to his office for executive consideration a number of bills which
had cleared the legislative process and which were subject to his action.
Florida Constitution, article III, section 28, states: "If any bill shall not
be returned within five days after it shall have been presented to the
Governor, (Sunday excepted) the same shall be a law, in like manner
as if he had signed it. If the Legislature, by its final adjournment prevent
such action, such bill shall be a law, unless the Governor within twenty
(20) days after the adjournment, shall file such bill, with his objections
thereto ... "
The legislature adjourned on Friday, June 2nd, and the governor
wished to know whether he would have twenty days after Friday, June
2nd, within which to act upon bills which reached his office on or after
Saturday, May 27th. In computing the time allowed for the approval of
a bill by the governor, the court stated that the day of presentation is
excluded and the last day of the specified period is included. Therefore,
Saturday, May 27th, 1961, should not be included as part of the constitutional five day period allowed the governor for executive action. Under
the constitutional language, Sunday, May 28th, 1961, is specifically excepted from the five day period; so the first "day" of the five day period
referred to in article III, section 28, began at 12:01 A.M. Monday, May
29th, 196], and the final day of the five day period expired at midnight,
June 2nd, 1961. The legislature, by its final adjournment at noon on June
2nd, 1961 interrupted the continuity of this constitutional five day period.
The result was that the governor was prevented from returning any of
the bills in question to the house of origin after noon, June 2nd, 1961.
Therefore, the final adjournment of the legislature brought into action
that portion of article III, section 28, which allows the governor twenty
days after final adjournment in which to consider appropriate action on
28
pending bills.
27. 131 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1961). The court has generally been liberal with veto
time periods. See Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 95 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1957).
28. Green v. Rawls, 122 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1960) (Roberts, J., concurring specially
and Terrell, J., agreeing with judgment), involved a somewhat different veto problem. A
suit had been brought to enjoin the state comptroller from issuing and delivering warrants
for salary to state officers in excess of annual salaries fixed by the legislature in a general

appropriation bill. The supreme court held that the State Budget Commission had power

to establish salaries for two government employees for amounts in excess of specific sunms
for the employees stated by the legislature in an appropriations bill, after a veto by the

governor of the items of the bill specifying the salaries. The case relates to the item veto
power of the governor. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 18, reads as follows: "The Governor shall
have power to disapprove of any item or items of any bills making appropriations of money
embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and

the item or items of appropriation disapproved shall be void, unless repassed according to
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C. Power to Appoint Circuit Judges
In Gray v. Bryant2 9 Governor-elect Farris Bryant sued for a declaratory
decree with respect to vacancies in the office of circuit judge and his
power to fill such vacancies by appointment. The case is important in
the sense that its decision dictated the power to appoint an exceptional
number of circuit judges to newly created judicial offices. The supreme
court held that ad interim vacancies in elective judical offices are filled
by appointment of the incumbent governor for a "term extending until
the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January next after the election
and qualification of the successor at the next general election." Therefore,
the next governor (Bryant) would have no authority to appoint a person
to the office of circuit judge where the office had been filled by appointment of the incumbent governor.
Florida Constitution, article V, section 6(2) gives the formula by
which the number of circuit judges in each of the sixteen judicial circuits
is to be determined. It reads as follows: "The Legislature shall provide
for one circuit judge in each circuit for each 50,000 inhabitants or major
fraction thereof according to the last census authorized by law." The
legislature had already acted to enforce this constitutional requirement as
to part of the circuits. The court held that article V, section 6 was selfexecuting once the 1960 federal census had revealed that these circuits

the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of other bills over the Executive veto."
The question was whether the words "of $12,000 per annum" and "of $10,000 per
annum" used in the appropriations bill hy the legislature constituted distinct "items" of
appropriations subject to veto by the governor. After the governor's veto the State Budget
Commission set the salaries of the two officers at $13,000 and $12,000. Quoting from
Fairfield v. Foster, 25 Ariz. 146, 157, 214. Pac. 319, 323 (1923), the court accepted this
definition of an item in an appropriations bill: " 'Whenever the Legislature goes to the
extent of saying in any bill . ..that a specified sum of money .. .shall be spent for a
specified purpose . . . while other sums mentioned in the bill are to be used otherwise,
at 16. Therefore, the governor's vetoes
...it is ...an "item" within the bill .....Id.
struck down constitutional "items." Under this definition the general sums for salaries
for each department, office or agency are also "items" so there may be items within items.
The court also stated that the effect of the vetoes was not to reduce the appropriations
for salaries for the two departments, leaving no funds for the payment of the two employees'
salaries. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 18 provides that "the part or parts of the bill approved
shall be the law..." and that only the item or items disapproved shall be void. Here the
legislature provided a general item of salary in the amount of $143,580 for each year of
the biennium for the Division of Corrections, and $1,014,794 and $1,005,004 for the
two years for the Florida Board of Forestry. Included within the totals appropriated for
these general items were specific items of salaries for the two employees. Although the
governor had the power to veto the entire appropriation for salaries for the departments,
he had not done so and he could not reduce the amount of the appropriations for salaries.
The creation of the salaries finally given the two employees came through use of the
Budget Commission's statutory powers. The Commission established the salaries of the
two employees in amounts greater than that established by the legislature.
29. 125 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1960) (Terrell and Roberts, JJ., dissenting; Hobson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part; Thornal, J., concurring). At issue were FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 6(2) (number of circuit judges), art. IV, § 7 (Governor's power to fill
vacant offices), art. XVIII, §§ 6, 7, 9 (general election time), art. V, § 14 (judicial office
vacant-term for successor).
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had populations which would authorize additional judges. The court
believed that the basic test in determining whether a constitutional provision should be construed as self-executing had been satisfied. The test is
whether or not the provision lays down a sufficient rule by which the
purpose it is intended to accomplish may be determined, enjoyed, or
protected without the aid of legislation.
Governor-elect Bryant contended that the terms of all circuit judges
expired at midnight, January 2nd, 1961. He would become governor on January 3rd. He argued that any appointments made by Governor Collins, filling the vacancies in this office, should expire at midnight, January 2nd,
1961.
The court stated that three sections of our constitution control this
problem; one chapter of the state statutes deals with this subject.
Article XVIII, section 6, is apropos to this discussion. It reads as follows: "The term of office for all appointees to fill vacancies in any of the
elective offices under this Constitution shall extend only to the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in January next after the election and qualification
of a successor." This is followed by section 7, which provides that: "In all
cases of election to fill vacancies in office such election shall be for that part
of the unexpired term commencing on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January next after such election." The court construed these sections
to provide a method for filling vacancies only until the electorate can vote
on the office, at the same time preserving orderly cycles of terms of office.
The intent of section 6 was construed so that a vacancy in an office is to be
filled by appointment for special or ad interim term, which is to be terminated upon the people electing a qualified successor. Therefore, once the executive power is exercised to fill a vacancy in the elective orrice, the power is
spent and may not be again exercised with respect to that office, unless it
falls vacant from one of the causes provided by law before the people have
an opportunity to elect a successor.
The court believed that the legislature, in adopting Florida Statutes,
chapter 114, agreed with the court's construction of section 6.30 Article 5,
section 14, is the last constitutional provision relating to filling of vacancies.
It reads: "When the office of any judge shall become vacant from any

30. FLA. STAT. § 114.01 (1961) reads as follows: "Every office shall be deemed
vacant in the following cases: . . . (6) When any office created or continued by the
constitution or laws shall not have been filled by election or appointment under the constitution or law creating or continuing such office .... " The court believed that the newly
created offices of circuit judge fell within this provision. These offices had not been filled
either by election or appointment. They were, therefore, subject to being filled by the
authority of FLA. STAT. § 114.04 (1961), which reads: "[Tihe governor shall fill such
office by appointment, and the person so appointed shall be entitled to take and hold such
office until the same shall be filled by an election as provided by law .... "
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cause, the successor to fill such vacancy shall be appointed or elected only
for the unexpired term of the judge whose death, resignation, retirement, or
other cause created such vacancy." The court construed this section to
not apply to vacancies in newly created offices, such as those involved in
this case, but only to those offices which have been filled once and have
become vacant because of the "death, resignation, retirement, or other
cause" which resulted in the vacation of the office by the previous holder.
Therefore, the purpose of this section was read by the court to not operate
as a limitation upon ad interim appointments to fill vacancies in judical offices. In essence, section 14 was construed so that one elected to fill a vacancy in an elective judicial office does not receive a new full term but only
that portion of the unexpired term of the officer or class of officers involved;
construed this way it is not inconsistent with article XVIII, section 6.
The ad interim term is a special term carved out of the regular term of
office. It begins when the office falls vacant and terminates with the election and qualification of a successor.
The offices involved in the case were now vacant. The executive power
of appointment can be exercised to fill an elective office when the office is
deemed vacant under the law. If the incumbent governor filled the offices
by appointment they would not thereafter be vacant in the sense that they
may be filled by executive appointment, but they would be vacant in the
sense that under the provisions of article XVIII, section 7, they are subject
to being filled by the people at the next general election. Any commission
issued by the incumbent governor in filling the vacant offices of circuit
judge would run to the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January, following the next ensuing general election to be held in November 1962.
D. Determination of Penalty by State Agency
Traditionally, in the United States, determination of the question
whether administrative agencies may penalize is answered in terms of separation of powers-is this a proper delegation of legislative power or is this
a use of exclusive judical power by the executive?
The Florida Real Estate Commission revoked the registration of petitioner as a real estate broker.31 In the order of revocation the Commission
stated: "It is our opinion and ultimate finding that defendant, John Murphy, is guilty of a crime against the laws of the State of Florida involving
31. See Murphy v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 117 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1959)
(O'Connell, J., dissenting to order denying petition for rehearing). The general law on
this problem would seem to be in agreement with the dissenting justice; see 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 213 (1943). To argue on the other side, for a moment, one could say that there is a
"play" on words here, i.e., that the commission is simply accomplishing what the justice
would allow-determination of fact which is related to an administrative sanction, not
criminal penalty.
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moral turpitude in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes
" In the notice given petitioner it was charged that he was guilty of a
.
crime against the laws of the state in that he, while acting as a notary public, falsified the acknowledgements of certain persons on applications for
registration as real estate salesmen. Under the statute referred to above the
registration of a broker may be suspended upon a finding of fact that the
broker has been guilty of a crime against the laws of the state involving
moral turpitude and the record of a conviction has been authenticated to
make it admissible in evidence. As authenticated, it is admissible as primafacie evidence of guilt.
The petitioner contended that the statute could be utilized by the
Commission only where the broker had been charged and convicted of a
crime in a court. Justice O'Connell, dissenting to the order denying petition
for rehearing, agreed with the petitioner. He took the view that the legislature may not grant to a commission the power to adjudicate guilt or innocence of crime. Petitioner had not been adjudged guilty of a crime in a
criminal court. The Commission took the position the legislature intended
the Commission to make this determination. Apparently a majority of the
justices agreed with the Commission. Justice O'Connell did agree that the
Commission could determine that the registrant had in fact committed
acts or engaged in conduct which, if presented in a court under proper
charges and after trial, might justify adjudication by the court of guilt of
crime. He also agreed that the Commission could use its determination
thereof as a ground for the basis of revocation or suspension. But he argued
that the Commission is without authority to "adjudicate" that acts constitute guilt of a crime. His plea was that Commission authority be limited
to determination that certain acts are sufficient cause for revocation of a
license.
E. Court Review of Administrative Agency Finding of Fact
Court review of the validity of administrative action is a problem in
32
separation of powers. Generally it should parallel, at least to some extent,
court review treatment of the validity of statutes, since administrative action
is normally inspired by legislation. In recent years one can see an improvement in the attitude of Florida courts toward the administrative process.
Our courts now tend to grant a presumption of correctness or validity to
3
administrative action, when constitutional issues are raised. 3
32. The position of administrative agencies vis-a-vis the courts is discussed in
COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENCIES AND TIE COURTS

(1951).

Among other sources,

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 29-30 (1958) defines the technical differences

in court review of "law" and "fact" findings or determinations.
33. Compare City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So.2d 681, 687-89 (Fla.
1949) with Miami Beach v. Hogan, 63 So.2d 493, 495 (Fla. 1953).
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In a number of cases the court reiterated its position on circuit court
review of findings of fact of administrative agencies, boards and officials. In
a typical case34 a Florida corporation doing business as the Liberty City
Amusement Park was proceeded against by the State Beverage Department
for revocation or suspension of its liquor license. The Park was accused of
selling whiskey during prohibited hours on Sunday and with permitting consumption of whiskey on the premises at the same time. The Park sought
relief, from an order of suspension entered by the Department, by filing a
petition for certiorari in the circuit court. The court granted certiorari and
quashed the Department's suspension order. The Department then filed a
petition for certiorari in the district court of appeal. The appellate court
held that on review of the Department's arder the circuit court was not free
to weigh or evaluate the evidence which had been presented to the director
but was charged with the "duty to examine the record and determine
whether the director's order was in accord with the essential requirements
of law and whether the director had before him competent substantial evidence to support his findings and conclusions."' 5 The writ of certiorari only
authorized the appellate court to determine whether the circuit court order
was "illegal or is essentially irregular or prejudicial and materially harmful
to the party duly complaining by a departure from essential requirements of
law." Further, an appellate court will not consider the "sufficiency of the
evidence, or the weight and probative force of the conflicting testimony."
However, the evidence which was before the agency will be reviewed to
determine whether the findings and conclusions of the agency are supported
by "competent substantial evidence" if it appears that the circuit court
reviewed the evidence under an illegal approach. Here the appellate court
believed that the circuit court did not review the agency's action on the
basis of the presence or absence of competent substantial evidence to support the director's order, but proceeded to re-weigh and re-evaluate the evidence and conflicting testimony. The term "competent and substantial evidence" was defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." It must be evidence which is
"sufficiently relevant and material that a reasonable mind would accept it
as adequate to support the conclusion reached. To this extent the substantial evidence should also be competent." So the effect of conflicting evidence and questions as to the weight and evaluation of the testimony are for
the agency, whose findings and conclusions are entitled to stand unless it
is made to appear that the agency departed in some manner from the
34. State Beverage Dep't. v. Ernal, Inc., 115 So.2d 566 (Fla. App. 1959) (review of
agency fact findings). Many of the decisions reviewing agency action have little to do with
constitutional law. Yet a large part of the decisions deal with court review of agency action
in the context of constitutional argument-particularly court review of zoning action or
license revocation.
35. Correctly citing De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 9.12, 916 (Fla. 1957).
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"essential requirements of the law" or that the decision reached was not supported on the record by competent and substantial evidence.36 Certiorari
was granted and the order of the circuit court was quashed.
F. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, similar to the
rule restricting court review of administrative action, is a species of the
separation of powers doctrine. Both rules operate to reduce the judicial
function vis-a-vis the administrative agency.
Once again Florida courts held that one must exhaust all administrative
remedies before he can complain before a court about administrative regulations, or statutes which authorize administrative regulations.8 7 Therefore, to
attack administrative regulations and orders, on the basis of possible unconstitutionality, it still is necessary in Florida for one to exhaust each administrative remedy through every administrative channel, obtaining a final administrative judgment before going into the courts.38
THE "CLASSIC" FREEDOMS3 9
The last several years have recorded an unusual number of decisions in
this critical area of constitutional law. Two limitations on state government
should be differentiated. Normally, one who argues that the state has acted
injuriously toward his freedoms of speech, press, assembly and religion
40
pleads the federal constitutional inhibition as well as that of the state.
Florida courts tend to merge the two limitations to the point that federal
and state cases are cited inter-changeably. This has resulted, no doubt, from
a conscientious effort on the part of the Florida Supreme Court to properly
effectuate the federal constitutional limitations on state power.
I.

SPEECH

May the Florida legislature penalize 4 a public employee who merely
36. Compare with approach in Jaffee, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence On The

Whole Record," 64

HARV.

L.

REV.

1233 (1951)

(an excellent article).

37. Stewart v. Stone, 130 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1961) and Wood v. Twin Lakes Mobile
Homes Village, 123 So.2d 738 (Fla. App. 1960).
38. In general, the federal requirement requires more "exhaustion" than does the
state law requirement. Compare Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41
(1938) with, e.g., Ritholz v. Ammon, 240 Wis. 578, 4 N.W.2d) 173 (1942).
39. The author has arbitrarily classified the decisions under one of four categories. It
should be noted, however, that in nearly every opinion the parties argued more than one of
the freedoms.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (due process), incorporating U.S. CoNsT. amend.
I (freedom of speech, press, assembly and religion). In Florida constitutional law: FLA.
CONST. Dics.. OF RicuTs § 5 (freedom of religion), § 6 (establishment of preference
clause), § 13 (freedoms of speech and press), § 15 (freedom of assembly and right to
petition).
41. FLA. STAT. § 104.31 (1961).
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advises a fellow employee to make a political contribution? Or is the penalty
invalid unless the advice is given in a coercive context? Moving under the
protective coloring of analogous federal decisions, 42 the Florida Supreme
Court upheld an information charging defendant with giving simple advice.43 Among several rationale, preservation of the "political purity" of
public employees amply justified the court's conclusion.
In State v. Smith, 44 the court neatly sidestepped Supreme Court decisions45 to save Florida Statute, section 447.04, which requires business agents
to obtain a license before representing a union. The license requirement was
construed so that it only applies to the functions of a business agent which
are unrelated to collective bargaining. So construed the court found no
"undue restraint" in the law on speech or assembly rights. This division of a
union agent's profession into two independent facets (speech and business)
could be questioned under federal constitutional requirements." Since the
agent will have to act for his union in both capacities, the license requirement will restrict his speech function as well as his non-speech or business
function.
II. PRESS
A. Obscenity and its Control
Federal constitutional standards 47 defining state control of the "obscene" have not yet been articulated by the United States Supreme Court.
Everyone patiently waits-courts, prosecutors, publishers, readers and so on
-for Supreme Court clarification of the Roth-Alberts opinions. 48 In the
meantime, unsophisticated interpretations of Roth-Alberts flood the reporters. We know that the First Amendment does not protect the "obscene."
We do not know what the "obscene" is. The basic issue is whether the
Supreme Court intended to thrust from constitutional protection only the
so-called "hard-core" pornography, or whether literature outside of this pure
"filth" has also been stripped of constitutional protection. 49
42. E.g., Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
43. State v. Stuler, 122 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1960) (Hobson, J., concurring in the conclusion and judgment; Roberts, J., not participating in the decision). Freedom of assembly
was argued also.
44. 123 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1960). At issue were U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2 (supremacy
clause); U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV (freedoms of speech and assembly).
45. Insofar as Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) is concerned, the author will
not comment; Hill involved a statutory pre-emption problem.
46. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), would seem to make the Florida
Supreme, Court's maneuver a somewhat uneasy one. However, American Fed'n of Labor
v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.. 1945), would seem to support the Florida
court.

47. See note 40 supra.
48. Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
49. Whether material such as Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capri-

corn is that, which the Court will describe as "obscene" is the problem. Compare the
Tropics with the material (for example, Memoirs of a Spankee and Slaves of the Lash) kept
by the Alberts for sale, supra note 48.
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Intertwined in this problem are others. What procedures are constitutionally necessary to determine the "obscene"? Must a jury be used, if requested? May the trial court decline an offer of expert testimony on the
literary qualities of that which the state claims is "obscene"? Is it significant
if the retailer sells to children as well as to adults? Does the intent of the
seller or publisher make a constitutional difference? (For example, some
material is purposely advertised for and sold to a limited audience of sexual
deviates.) Is "obscene" material that which arouses an impure thought, or
that which arouses an impure thought which is likely to be followed by
unlawful action?
One comment might be made. Careful scholarship 5" indicates that at
least a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court will limit state power
to regulate literature to the "hard-core" material. This definition of "obscene" will grant constitutional protection to relatively serious literary works,
such as Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County. It will deny constitutional sanctuary to "filth," published and sold to the
sick of our society. 5' Certainly the Court will not deny literature to adult
consumers because of the fear of a state (acting through a legislature,
52
prosecutor, jury and judge) that its children's morals need protection.
There are several recent Florida cases. Tracey v. State5 3 construed
Florida Statutes, section 847.01(1) (b) (1959), which made it unlawful to
possess "obscene" material. Justice O'Connell's opinion declared the statute
valid, against freedom of speech and press arguments. In view of a federal
decision 5 4 the court wisely required that the defendant have "knowledge of
the obscene character of the materials possessed and sold." Scienter, therefore, is an essential element of the crime charged and must be alleged in the
information and proven by the state at trial.55
50. See, e.g., Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 60
(1960).
51. The Court may even be limiting regulatory power beyond this strict standard.
See Manual Enterprises v. Day, 82 Sup. Ct. 1432 (1962).
52. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). "Surely, this is to burn the house to
roast the pig." Id. at 383.
53. 130 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1961 ). At issue were U.S. CoNs'r. amends. 1, XIV (freedoms
of speech and press; procedural due process-clarity); FLA. CoNsT. OF RIGHTS § 12
(procedural due process-clarity), and § 13 (freedoms of speech and press). A second count
charged the defendant with sale of an obscene book, prohibited by FLA. STAT. § 847.01(1)
(1959). In the 1961 revision of Florida Statutes, thc possession and sale prohibitions are
found in §§ 847.011(2) and 847.011(1) (a) respectively.
54. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
<,
55. Since the defendant apparently admitted possession with knowledge of the obscene
character of the material, the difficult problem, raised in the Smith opinion, supra note 54,
of how the state can prove "scienter". was not presented. Likewise, since the Roth case,
supra note 48, charge ("obscene, lewd and lascivious") was used in this case,, the court
assumed that no real problem of due process clarity was raised. In Cohen v. State, 125
So.2d 560 (Fla. 1961) (Roberts, J.,
concurring specially), FLA. STAT. § 847.01(1) (1959),
penalizing sale of any "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, immoral, degrading,
sadistic, masochistic or disgusting" book, magazine, etc., was upheld. The court required
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The First District Court of Appeal, in an opinion50 written by Associate Judge Mason, avoided research and analysis on several questions still unanswered since Roth-Alberts. Florida Statutes, section 847.01(1)(c)
(1959) authorized state and county prosecuting officials to seek a declaratory judgment to determine whether "printed matter" was "obscene." If the
circuit court answer was yes, that court entered an order under which one
who sold or distributed the "printed matter" was guilty of a felony. Among
the arguments pressed on the court by the defendant were the following:
(1)

Must a jury57 decide the Roth-Alberts test for obscenity?
("whether to the average person, applying community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to purient interest?")

(2)

Is it constitutionally necessary for the state to prove the
"contemporary community standards in Duval County"?1 8

(3)

May the state penalize sale and distribution of literary endeavors which are peripheral to "hard-core pronograpby"? 59

The First District Court of Appeal, with apparent ease, answered each
question in line with the state's position.
Perhaps even more disturbing was this court's solution to another RothAlberts problem. In evaluating whether the material (the sale or distribution
of which was the basis of the state's action) was, in fact, obscene, the First
District Court of Appeal did not have the "exhibits" before it, as part of
the record. The trial judge's conclusion apparently was final. The effect of
this constitutional anomaly would seem to be as follows: (1) if the publisher or major distributor, to pose a likely case, of the literature in Florida is
knowledge on the part of the seller here, also. Omission of this element in the information
led the court to remand. Thoughtfully, from the state's point of view, the court relieved
the state of the burden of proving that the seller had read the material sold; instead, conviction was authorized on circumstantial evidence. There may be some federal constitutional
limits on this type of evidence. See Smith v. California, note 54 supra; Manual Enterprises
v. Day, 82 Sup. Ct. 1432, 1440-41 (1962).
56. Rachleff v. Mahon, 124 So.2d 878 (Fla. App. 1960). At issue were U.S. CONST.
amends. I, XIV (freedom of press) and procedural due process under one or both constitutions.
57. States Judge Mason: "We brush this argument aside . . . we know of no con-

stitutional or statutory requirement of jury trial in this kind of declaratory decree proceed-

ing .... " The judge should have stopped with the statement 'that defendant waived jury
trial. See the possibility suggested in Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, The

1960 Supreme Court Rev., p. 1, 38-40.

58. Judge Mason states that the trial judge can determine "the common conscience

of the community." Rachleff v. Mah.on, 124 So.2d 878, 881 (Fla. App. 1960). Again
Judge Mason was aided by a failure of counsel-this time because the defense did not
produce such testimony. Still, the problem merits thought. See Manual Enterprises v.
Day, 82 Sup. Ct. 1432, 1436 (1962), for a recent Court comment on proof necessity.
59. Judge Mason states that it may do so, and the statute, as he interprets it,
sustains his position. Rachleff v. Mahon, 124 So.2d 878, 882 (Fla. App. 1960). This court
might well read the articulate opinion of the Court of Appeals of New York in People v.

Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681 (1961).
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the defendant, a single circuit judge, manipulating the Roth-Alberts standard, apparently has the power to withdraw from Florida readers literature
which, in his judgment, is obscene; (2) what is, in essence, a question of
law and fact becomes a sacred one of fact, contrary, at least, to the practices of the majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court 0°
If state, county and municipal authorities sought to curb only the socalled "hard-core" pornography, serious constitutional questions would not
arise under Roth-Alberts. Traditional patterns of censorship in the United
States indicate strongly that such will not be the case.0 1 Unsophisticated
2
censorship is not a seldom thing.
B. Invasion of Privacy and Libel
The Third District Court of Appeal balanced the right of an individual
to privacy against the freedoms of speech and press0 3 in a suit against a
newspaper and writer for invasion of plaintiff's privacy. The inane 4 comment about the plaintiff by a gossip columnist led to provable injury and
the item published involved neither a "public personage" nor information
that was of "public interest." The complaint stated a cause of action. 5
0 0'
presents a more difficult freedom of
Miami Herald v. Brautigam
press question. The Herald criticized in two editorial statements 7 the state

60. See Mr. Justice Black's cry in the wilderness. Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents
of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 690-91 (1959).
61. See, e.g., DowNs, THE FIRST FREEDOM, 133-250 (1960).
62. See, e.g., Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REV.
40 (1938). It is rare that one reads literate judical opinions in this area. For two very literate
opinions, however, see District Judge Woolsey and Circuit Judge Augustus Hand, United
States v. Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) and 72 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1934).
63. The opinion mentions these freedoms; however, no specific constitutional inhibitions are discussed.
64. "Wanna hear a sexy telephone voice? Call
and ask for Louise."
65. -larms v. Miami Daily News, 127 So.2d 715 (Fla. App. 1961). The decision
would not seem to be injurious to legitimate press and reader relations. See Warren &
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) and Nizer, Right of Privacy:
A Half Century's Developments, 39 Min. L. REV. 526 (1941). Florida courts might
consider another factor in testing such clains-whether or not the purpose of publication
was to report news. See Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959).
66. 127 So.2d 718 (Fla. App. 1961) (Carroll, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 82 Sup.
Ct. 828 (1962) (Black and Douglas, JJ., were of opinion that certiorari should be granted).
At issue were U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV (freedoms of speech and press); FLA. CONST.
DECL. OF RIClIT § 13 (freedoms of speech and press).
67. One of the editorials reads as follows:
"Why Does State Attorney Muzzle The Grand Jury?
The Action of George A. Brautigam, state attorney, in throwing a road
block in front of a hard-working, conscientious Grand Jury, raises two
immediate questions: Is he afraid of something, or of someone? Is he
trying to protect someone?
Neither may be the reason, but the State Attorney has invited both
questions. The Grand Jury is the people's agency of investigation. It
supplements the work of the State Attorney, who is the people's
prosecutor in important cases.
His office, however, is not above the Grand Jury's attention. When the
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attorney's efforts to suppress an interim report of the Dade County Grand
Jury. In an action for libel, defenses were pleaded of truth, fair comment
made in good faith and without malice, and privilege under the federal
and state constitutions.
Subsequent to the publication, the Florida Supreme Court upheld
Brautigam's motion to suppress and ordered the grand jury report expunged
in State ex rel. Brautigam v. Interim Report of Grand Jury.68 Then, before
the supreme court validated his motion to suppress, the plaintiff was defeated in his bid for re-election as state's attorney.
The court dismissed the constitutional issues by apparently treating
the freedoms of speech and press limitations as inapplicable to state court
effectuation of private libel suits; that is to say, private law sanctions rather
than public law sanctions were laid upon the press here.69 Further, Florida
libel law was described as requiring the press to publish the truth with a
"high degree of care" demanded of the prcss. 70 The defense of fair comment was heavily restricted by the requirement that no comment can
be fair if it is based on misstatement of fact. 71 The court further narrowed the fair comment defense by insistence that a newspaper is liable
for imputing "one's motives, want of loyalty or misconduct in office" unless
the newspaper can prove the absolute "truth" of the imputation. The burden of proof on the defense of "truth, plus good motives and fair comment" was placed upon the defendant. .Since the jury returned a verdict of
$25,000.00 compensatory damages and $75,000.00 punitive damages, the
impact of this decision on what Florida subscribers will read in local newspapers is fairly obvious. Libel experts will now advise that, for example, the
words in one of the editorials "Is he trying to protect someone?" be weakState Attorney and the Grand Jury are in conflict, as in this instance,
the people's rights are in jeopardy. In asking Judges [sic] Robert L.
Floyd of Circuit Court to withhold the jury's report, Brautigam is off

the judge should have
the track of his public responsibility. We think
told him so instead of granting his request .
As Long as Brautigam stands in the untenable position of asking the

court to keep the jury's findings from the people he invites suspicion.
He can remove it only be reversing his course; By making available to

the people, who have the right to know, what the Grand jury has uncovered. As it stands, Brautigam, the man the people elected to represent them, has run out on them.
Who will speak for the peop!e in Judge Floyd's court Monday?"
68. 93 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1957).
69. This may be a questionable basis for decision. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1

(1948) and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). The approach of the Court in Black
v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956), would, of course, sustain the Florida court's
action. The problem is whether state court enforcement of "private" libel law can be
official governmental action limited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
70. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), indicates, in another context, how
evidentiary evaluation requirements can shade into constitutional problems.
71. The court accepted RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 606 (1938) (Privileged Criticism)
but not the extension thereof. See § 607, comment c at 280, concerning public officers"honest criticism even though it be extravagant and unjustified."
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ened drastically. Florida courts will, apparently, hold harmless the editorial
writer "who adds to the recital (of 'facts') a little touch by his piquant
pen." Those newspaper readers who enjoy their editorials on the rocks will
now receive them in the sweet syrup of "slight irony" or "delightful touches
of style" (quotes by the court).
Judge Carroll's dissent thrust to the heart of the case. The trial court
judge had permitted the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, in the
Interim Report of Grand Jury decision, to be entered into evidence by the
plaintiff and argued to the jury. That decision supported, even commended,
Brautigam's action to suppress the grand jury report. At the time of the
Herald's editorials, the legality of Brautigam's action had not been determined by the Florida Supreme Court. Judge Carroll believed that the defense of fair comment was "doomed" once the jury understood that
Brautigam's actions were legal, even though the decision determining the
legality of Brautigam's actions was rendered subsequent to the Herald's
comments. To put it another way, no attorney could have advised the
Herald that Brautigam's actions were within the law when the Herald spoke.
To Judge Carroll, whether publications are libelous is to be judged as of the
"time and surrounding circumstances when they were made." The effect
was to impose "absolute liability" if dishonorable or corrupt motives are
imputed, regardless if the "facts" are not necessarily untruthful at the time
the
of publication.7 2 In stripping the Herald of "its shell of fair comment"
73
court may have violated the press's freedom of speech and press.
III.

ASSEMBLY

74

A. Legislative Investigations
In Graham v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.75 the critical question put to the Reverend Graham by the committee was "Are you
a member of the N.A.A.C.P.?" The case arose out of a proceeding to adjudge the witness in contempt of a circuit court for refusal to answer the
legislative committee's question. Record testimony indicated possible reprisals against any "known active leader of N.A.A.C.P.," amply demonstrating that a severe impact on freedom of assembly follows such public
disclosure. Justice Thornal's opinion properly required the state to prove a
72. This would not seem to be in line with the Restatement view: "reasonable

grounds" for belief of publisher would seem to be a defense in the present case. See
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 601 (1938).
73. Denial of certiorari, at least in theory, has little legal significance. See Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917-19
(1950). Strangely, see note 66 supra, in our present case, two Justices of the Supreme Court

noted their view that certiorari should have been granted.
74. A recent and interesting essay on the state and federal cases is ABERNATHY,
RIGHT

OF ASSEMBLY AND AssocIATION

THE

(1961).

75. 126 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1960). At issue were U.S.
of speech and assembly).

CONST. amends. I, XIV (freedoms
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"necessity for disclosure of membership by this witness," a "showing
that
the State labors under a compelling and pressing need for the information."
The "burden" of proof was placed upon the state, which is probably another way of saying that the presumption of validity does not assist the
7 6
state when frustration of a First Amendment freedom is pleaded.
If Graham answered the question the state would gain nothing but
an admission that he associated with an "organization perfectly legitimate
but allegedly unpopular in the community." The record rationale for requiring the answer fell in the constitutional category of N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama 77 and Bates v. City of Little Rock.7 8 The Florida Supreme Court
properly reversed the circuit court order adjudging Graham in contempt.
The Florida court came to a contrary conclusion in Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigating Comm.7 9 Justice Thornal, in a highly sophisticated opinion, may have captained this cruise of his court to the constitutional safety of Uphaus v. Wyman, 80 steering a course between the horns
of the dilemma created by N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama and Sweezy v. New
Hampshire.81 Then, again, he may not; the issue will probably be decided
during the Supreme Court's present term.
Gibson was the president of a local N.A.A.C.P. branch; he was ordered
by a circuit court to bring the local's membership list in order to answer
committee questions. The questions required his answers as to whether certain persons, already identified by other witnesses before the committee
as communists, were members of the N.A.A.C.P. Gibson refused to refer
to the membership list in order to answer. In other words, Justice Thornal
may have found the "impelling public need (for the information) that
justifies subordinating the constitutionally assured private right (freedoms
of speech and assembly) to the exercise of governmental power." And he
could cite, among other decisions of the Supreme Court, Uphaus v. Wyman
to support his court's thesis that governmental inquiries about communists,
in view of the violence inherent in their objectives, weigh heavier on the
constitutional scales than the First Amendment freedoms of speech and
assembly.
On the other hand, this legislative thrust at the N.A.A.C.P. may well
be frustrated on review by the Supreme Court. Even the Uphaus language

76.
77.
78.
79.

See
357
361
126

Justice Rutledge's language in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529 (1945).
U.S. 449 (1958).
U.S. 516 (1960).
So.2d 129 (Fla. 1961), restored to calendar of United States Supreme

Court, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3001 (1962).
(speech and assembly).

At issue were U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV

80. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
81. 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (insofar as the First Amendment issue is concerned).
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may justify this result.82 At any rate, Justice Thornal has given the Supreme
Court an opinion which may sharply divide that Court's members. 88
B.

Public Employment Requirements 4
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

8"
5

The Florida Supreme Court upheld the validity of a statute requiring
a loyalty oath86 in a suit brought by a public school teacher. Since the
court had already construed87 the statutory oath to reach only "knowing"
membership in proscribed organizations, no support"" apparently 9 remained
in federal or state constitutional law to bolster the teacher's several constitutional arguments. The freedom of speech and assembly hurdles were not
difficult for the Florida court. 0°
BOARD OF CONTROL EMPLOYEES"

1

In Jones v. Board of Control 2 the court validated a Board of Control
82. Justice Clark's opinion, see note 80 supra, requires that the state demonstrate
a "nexus" between the suspect organization and "subversive activities." In Gibson, Florida
may not have made this demonstration; the record showed that an "investigator" identified
fourteen people by name and Communist Party membership card number. He testified that
the fourteen "had been known to have participated" in the Miami branch of the N.A.A.C.P.
In Uphaus, the state proved that "Vorld Fellowship" (suspect organization) was related
to "subversive" activities. This probably was impossible for the state to prove about the
N.A.A.C.P. in Gibson.
83. In Uphaus, supra note 80, there were four dissenting Justices (each presently
on the Court).
84. Much has been written on public employment requirements which involve constitutional issues. See, e.g., GELLHORN, THE STATES AND SUBVERSION (1952) (some of
this relates to our problem); Mosher, Government Employees Under the Hatch Act, 22
N.Y.U.L.Q. 233 (1947); Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM. L. REV.
99 (1916) (equal protection possibilities); Comment, Constitutionality of State Legislation Affecting Public Employees, 18 CEo. WASH. L. REV. 541 (1950).
85. See generally HAMILTON & MORT, TIHE LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1959).
86. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 125 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1960), rev'd, 82
Sup. Ct. 275 (1961) (clarity requirement of due process, under U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV). At issue in the Florida opinion wero FLA. CoNsT. art. XVI, . 2 (oath of state
officials); FLA. CONsT. DECL. OF RIGHTS §§ 13 (speech), 15 (assembly); U.S. CONST.
amends. I and XIV (freedoms of speech and assembly); U.S. CONST. art, I, § 10 (bill
of attainder and ex post facto clauses); and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (due process
clarity requirement). Florida due process clarity requirements may also be in issue.
87. State v. Diez, 97 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1957).
88. Wienan v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), probably requires nothing more.
89. Except that the oath was unconstitutionally vague; Cramp v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 82 Sup. Ct. 275 (1961). The Supreme Court's opinion does have a First
Amendment flavor to it, however.
90. Among other federal decisions, Adler v. Board of Educ. 342 U.S. 485 (1952),
may leave relatively limited areas in which teachers can still argue their First Amendment
freedoms.
91. For an interesting treatment of some of the higher education problems, see
BYSE & JOUGIlN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1959).

92. 131 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1961). At issue were U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV
(freedom of speech and association or assembly), XIV (administrative procedural due
process and substantive due process); FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHT §§ 13, 15 (freedoms
of speech and assembly), 12 (administrative procedural due process and substantive due
process).
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rule prohibiting university employees from seeking election to public office.
The Board fired Professor Jones, during his term contract period, for running for the office of circuit judge. Jones sued for breach of contract, alleging invalidity of the Board's rule. The federal and state freedoms of
speech and assembly, as they uniquely merge into an "academic freedom"
when pleaded by a teacher, were argued by the plaintiff.
The court stated that it weighed the interests of the state in effectuating the rule against the rule's impact on the teaching profession's "academic freedom" and validated. Few today would deny the propriety of the
rule as imposed upon the policemen 93 or mint roller.94 The unusual relationship, in an intellectual community, between the teacher and the student,
noted9 5 in recent opinions of the Supreme Court did not dissuade the
Florida court from vitiating the presumption of validity, even though the
First Amendment freedoms were pleaded.9 6 The court, however, was not
directly bound by Supreme Court precedents and could, with constitutional
propriety, follow the course it chose.9 7 One can surmise that there are, at
least, some federal constitutional limitations on state control of teachers'
political activities."
IV.

RELIGION

99

The court crippled the latest legislative endeavor to pass a valid Sunday
closing law.' 0 0 It is the authors' opinion, and probably also that of the
members of the legislature, that it is not possible to write a valid Sunday
closing law in Florida.' 0 Admitting that the legislature can close Sunday
businesses, to require a day of enforced rest without violating the "Wall"
principle, the court this time, chose substantive due process and equal pro-

93. McAulliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517

(1892).
94. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
95. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)

and Sweezy v. New Hampshire,

354 U.S. 234 (1957).
96. See note 94 supra.
97. For example, Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), plows a wide
furrow through academic freedom arguments.
98. See note 95 supra.
99. See Paulsen, State Constitution, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms,
4

620 (1951).
100. Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1961) (Terrell and Roberts, JJ.,
dissenting). At issue were U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV (separation of church and state);
FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 5 (same); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV (substantive due
VANO. L. REV.

process and equal protection-read dissents); FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS §§ I (equal
protection), 12 (substantive due process); FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 (legislative power),
16 (legislative title requirements). See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617
(1961); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961),
for the federal viewpoint toward Sunday closing laws.
101. See Alloway, FloridaConstitutionalLaw, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 501, 514 (1960).
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tection, under the Florida Constitution, 10 2 as its constitutional satellites from
whence to strike.
In another case, taxpayer-parents sued public school officials for injunctive relief against distribution of the King James version of the Bible
in public sclools.' 05 The Gideons had enlarged their distribution from hotel
rooms to school rooms. The court of appeal held that the complaint stated
a cause of action. Its basis was that distribution of this religious work in
public schools violated the requirement of a "wall of separation" of church
and state and demonstrated a state "preference" for one branch of religion.
The opinion pointed out, in connection with the latter point, that "Protestant groups" might well show sectarian resentment if the Koran had been
distributed.
Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trusteest 04 involved the
use of public school buildings for religious meetings. The Florida Supreme
Court validated the usage because it was temporary in nature, to end when
church buildings under construction were finished. Further, the usage was
during "Sunday non-school hours." Since no sect had been denied the school
building, no "preference" was found. Use of public property by churches
in Florida does not seem curbed by our local constitutional law, as construed by Florida courts. 10 5
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 10
I.

INTRODUCTION

Substantive due process is the major constitutional vehicle utilized by
the Florida Supreme Court to deny to the state the power to take or regulate life, liberty or property. This constitutional inhibition does not relate
to the procedures necessary to take or regulate, but rather to the validity
of the exercise of state power, as such. Traditionally, the Florida Supreme
Court catagorizes substantive due process as a problem relating to the
breadth of the state "police power." Under Florida due process, the "police
power" must be related to the "health, safety, morals or general welfare" of
Florida's citizens. Generally speaking, this issue in Florida constitutional
102. It is difficult, from the opinion, to determine which constitutions are involved
and whether the invaliadation is under substantive due process and/or equal protection
requirements.
103. Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So.2d 181 (Fla. App.
1960), cert. denied, 129 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1961). At issue were FLA. CONST. DECL. OF
RIGHTS § 6 (no "religious preference") and U.S. CoNs'r. amends. I, XIV (freedom of
religion). The decision is in line with Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857
(1953), appal dismissed, 348 U.S. 816 (1954).
104. 115 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1959). At issue were FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS §

6 (religious preference); U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV (freedom of religion).
105. See, e.g., Koerner v. Borck, 100 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1958).

106. See generally Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due
Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 226 (1958).

1962]

TRENDS IN FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

law is raised procedurally by causes of action which allow Florida courts
to evaluate in de novo fashion, the factual basis for the necessity or reasonableness of the legislative police power activity. Florida courts, at least in
theory, grant judicial grace to the legislative department by means of a
"presumption of validity." This "presumption," however, has had an uneasy
10 7
career in Florida.
In theory, of course, a general police power is granted under our state
constitution to the legislature. In practice, Florida courts tend to break
the general police power into the traditional facets-safety regulations,
zoning requirements, eminent domain and so on. This section will track
the Florida court categories of the state police power.
II.

REGULATION OF BUSINESSES AFFECTED
WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST1

08

Using substantive due process as the criterion, the Florida Supreme
Court generally authorizes the legislature a greater amount of freedom to
regulate so-called businesses "affected with a public interest," than those
classified otherwise.
Normally, the court has permitted the Florida legislature to heavily
regulate both transportation and communication companies in the state,
both as to rates and practices. In Greyhound Corp. v. Carter"9 the Railroad Commission bad denied the petition of the Greyhound Corporation
to discontinue scheduled routes between Cedar Key and Gainesville. The
court noted that if the company were permitted to abandon the service
the result would be to completely deprive a number of communities of all
public transportation facilities. The testimony was "quite clear that many
people live in the affected area who do not own automobiles." The petitioner's evidence was "woefully inadequate to meet its burden of showing
material adverse effect on its overall operation or financial structure on the
operation of this line." The court stated that in order to abandon such
a public service it was necessary that the transportation company show not
only that the facility is operated at a loss but that the loss affects substantially the overall operation of the company.
Substantive due process requirements disallow a state regulatory agency

107. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Ervin, 64 So.2d 166, 169 (Fla. 1953) with Miami
Springs v. Scoville, 81 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1955).
108. See McAllister, Lord Hale and Businesses Affected with a Public Interest, 43
HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930). For a more recent treatment, see Paulsen, Persistence of
Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91, 94 (1950).
109. 131 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961) (Hobson, J., concurring specially in judgment;
Roberts, J., concurring in judgment). At issue, probably, was FLA. CONST. DECL. OF
RIcHTS § 12 (substantive due process). The case may simply relate to a statutory construction point,
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from fixing a rate structure for a corporation, affected with the public
interest, which is confiscatory in nature. The court took the view that
it is the overall operation that furnishes the proper factors used by the
regulatory agencies in fixing lawful charges for the use of the company
facilities. The court noted that terminal points inpublic service lines are
often operated at a loss. However, a state may require that this occasionally occur as part of the service expected of those who hold "public,
or quasi-public, monopolies to promote the development and expansion of
outlying and marginal areas."''110
In General Tel. Co. v. Carter,"' the Florida court took a position
which apparently, but not really, was somewhat contrary to its position in
the Greyhound case. The petitioning telephone company was a Florida
corporation conducting a general telephone business in the state, including
local and long distance telephone service. Petitioner also provided long
distance telephone service outside of the territory it serviced, through its
connections with other companies within Florida and other states. The
petitioner filed a petition with the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities
Commission requesting authority to increase its intrastate rates by an
amount which would raise its rate of return to "not less than 7.25% per
annum on its net investment of its property devoted to intrastate telephone
service." After hearings, the Commission made an order incorporating the
following findings: (1) a rate base of $88,658,381.00 represents the reasonable value of the petitioner's property upon which it is entitled to earn a
fair and reasonable return; (2) a return of 6.68% on the above rate base
constitutes a fair and reasonable return on petitioner's property.
Petitioner requested a reconsideration and the Commission issued a new
order. This order gave the utility a net operating income of "slightly more
than 6.55% on its intrastate (italics added) exchange rate base of
$68,004,934.00." The second order specifically found that a return of
6.55% was not confiscatory in nature. The petitioner sought court review
of the orders.
The court agreed with the petitioner that the Commission erred when
it based the percentage increase granted on the "system" rate base. This
followed, the court believed, because this method of calculation amounted
to a consideration of the petitioner's "interstate property, operating expenses
and revenues in determining the reasonableness of intrastate telephone
rates." The Commission could not use the "system" figure of $88,658,381.00
110. Particular constitutional standards which bind the regulatory agency in fixing
rates are difficult to ascertain. See Hale, Utility Regulation in the Light of the Hope
Natural Gas Case, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 488 (1944).
111. 115 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1959). At issue, although not cited precisely, were U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8 (interstate commerce clause) and FLA. CONST. DrCL. OF RIGHTS §
12 (substantive due process-fair return).

1962]

TRENDS IN FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

711

and apply it to the 6.68% rate of return. The reason? The court believed
itself bound by federal decisions stating that where the business of the
carrier is both interstate and intrastate, the question whether a scheme
of maximum rates fixed by the state for intrastate transportation affords
a fair return must be determined by considering separately the value of the
property employed in the intrastate business and the compensation allowed
in that business under the rates prescribed. A state cannot justify unreasonably low rates for domestic transportation, considered alone, on the ground
that the carrier is earning large profits in its interstate business. On the
other hand, the carrier cannot justify unreasonably high rates on the
domestic business because only in that way it is able to meet its losses
112
on an interstate business.
Therefore in fixing rates the Commission must, where a corporation
does both an intrastate and an interstate business, separate the corporation's capital devoted to the independent spheres of commerce. However,
the court found that the Commission had rectified its error in the first
order and, in the second order, had made the requisite separation, finding
that a return of 6.55% on the intrastate rate base of $68,004,934.00 was a
"just and reasonable rate of return."
The court in General Tel. Co. again authorized the regulatory commissions and agencies to follow such accounting methods as they may
choose so long as the "end result" of such methods is the establishment
of a just and reasonable rate. Introduction of the interstate commerce
clause issue, in the General Tel. Co. case, easily distinguishes it from the
Greyhound case. Certainly as to due process requirements of a "fair
return," the cases are not at constitutional odds.
IV.

SPENDING,

DISPOSING AND

BORROWING

POWERS

At times the Florida Supreme Court uses the Florida Constitution,
article IX, section 10,113 as a vehicle to articulate the so-called public
purpose doctrine (i.e., the state must tax, spend, etc. for a public, as
opposed to a private, purpose); likewise, from time to time, the court uses
substantive due process. For convenience the author has classified State v.
Suwannee County Dee. Authority,114 as a facet of substantive due process.
112. Citing, e.g., Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352 (1913). The Florida court's
interpretation of federal requirements may be too inflexible; see generally Freeman, An
"Enlightened Judgment" Approach to Rate of Return, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1380 (1948).
113. It reads as follows: "The credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned
to any individual, company, corporation or association ..... The Legislature shall not
authorize any county, city, borough, township or incorporated district . . . to obtain or

appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution,

or individual."
114. 122 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1960)

(Thornal, J., concurring specially; Terrell, J.,

dissenting; Roberts, J., hearing the argument but not participating
appeal dismissed, 132 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1961).

in the decision),
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In the Suwannee County case, the state appealed from a final decree
validating revenue anticipation certificates in the amount of $100,000, proposed to be issued by the Suwannee County Development Authority. The
Authority was created by a special act of the legislature "for the purpose
of performing such acts as shall be necessary for the sound planning for,
and development of Suwannee County." 115 It was empowered to "acquire
real estate, to construct projects on such property and to lease or make
contracts with respect to the use or disposition of same in any manner the
Authority deems to its best advantage." "Project" was defined to mean the
"acquisition of lands, properties and improvements for development, expansion and promotion of industry, commerce, agriculture, natural resources"
and so forth and the "construction of buildings and plants for the purpose
of selling, leasing or renting" to private persons or corporations. The
Authority was granted the power to issue revenue anticipation certificates
to pay for all or any part of the cost of its projects. By another act the
legislature established a revolving fund for the Authority and directed the
Board of County Commissioners to pay into the fund, from the county's
share of race track funds, a certain amount of money each year for three
years.
The constitutional issue in the case was whether or not the use of
the proceeds from sale of the certificates for the purchase of land and
construction of buildings thereon, for use by private enterprise, was a
"public" or "private" purpose. The evidence entered by members of the
Authority showed that the proceeds from the certificates would be used
to purchase land, and construct buildings on it, to lease to private industry
(which the Authority hoped to bring into the county). The Authority
members did not present testimony about a specific program involving
particular industries and particular lands and buildings. On this evidence
a majority of the court held that the certificate proceeds would be used
for a private rather than a public purpose.
The court distinguished the 1958 decision, State v. Cotney, 116 on the
following factors: (1) no proposed issue of revenue certificates was before
the court in that case; (2) in Cotney, the Development Authority had
already acquired a tract of surplus land from the federal government and it
proposed to develop that land as "one project," including an airport and
golf course, "with the remainder" to be sold or leased to private enterprise
for commercial use; (3) there was nothing in the Cotney record to show
that the leasing or selling to private enterprise "for private use" of a
portion of the lands was the "primary purpose" for the acquisition of the
land.
115. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-1903.

116. 104 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1958).
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On these facts the court stated that Cotney held that the private use
was only "incident" to the total plan of the Authority. Reading the two
decisions together it would seem that the test is that the "private use"
must be "only incidental to a public purpose," when public benefits in
Florida are granted to private entrepreneurs.
A possible path to constitutional safety for such development authorities was given by the court when it complained that no description was
given of the specific program, by the Authority, to be financed by the
certificates. The court requested that the description, to be incorporated
in the petition to validate the certificates, should be sufficiently detailed
to enable the public and the state to determine whether the issuing agency
can lawfully expend public monies therefor (i.e., whether the court's test,
above, is met). These words have particular significance in view of Justice
Thornal's concurring opinion. The justice stated that the testimony of the
members of the Authority was "entirely speculative as to how or for what
purpose the revenue bond proceeds will be used." He interpreted the
opinion of the majority to hold that the construction and leasing of a
warehouse to private concerns would in all events be illegal. He was not
willing to go this far, but he did desire evidence "showing" that the money
to be borrowed will be used for "the public purpose" contemplated by the
authorizing statute.
Justice Terrell's dissent flatly determined that the proposed use of
funds from the sale of certificates would be for a public purpose. Justice
Terrell's position, unlike that of a majority of his colleagues, would seem
to be in this century in constitutional law.117 He carefully described the
history of Suwannee County, which in many ways is a disturbing one.
Suwannee has enjoyed a slowly decreasing economy. To use his words,
it is "apparent that the economy of Suwannee County had gotten in a bad
way. Its people were casting about for means to revive it. They adopted
the plan defined in [the special act] . . . . It is, of course, an experiment
but if the means employed are lawful, it is not within the province of this
court to say nay." 118
V. ZONING POWER" 0
In general, the Florida courts have granted, under substantive due
process standards, a healthy range of discretion to zoning officials whose
orders and regulations affect property values. The zoning requirement
117. See, e.g., the approa'h of the Court of Appeals of New York to the public
purpose, or use, doctrine in Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 227 N.Y.S.2d

903 (1962) (powers to condemn, and dispose of, property).
118. 122 So.2d at 198.
119. The impact on state appellate courts of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926) has not been as great as one would think. See, e.g., Johnson, Constitutional
Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 199 (1955).
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must necessarily be not "unreasonable" as applied to the property in question;120 but a zoning ordinance is presumptively valid "so that the appellant . . . assumes the 'extraordinary' burden" of proving the ordinance
invalid. 12' Further, "the courts do not have the right . . . to substitute
their judgment . . .where the question [of reasonableness, undoubtedly]
is fairly debatable.' 22
City of Sarasota v. Sunad, Inc.,I2 3 is typical of recent Florida opinions
following the above standards. A company in the poster panel business
sued for declaratory decree to determine the validity of part of a city
poster ordinance. The plaintiff argued against the validity of the ordinance
provisions "limiting the size of signs to 180 sq. ft., prohibiting combustible
material on poster panels in fire zones 1 and 2 of the City of Sarasota
and requiring the removal or alteration of signs not meeting the requirements of the ordinance."'1 24 Apparently the substantive due process argument of the plaintiff was that Sarasota is not a city which is authorized,
under decisions of the Florida Supreme Court 1 25 to zone for aesthetic
considerations. The Second District Court of Appeal noted that the city
charter indicated a legislative finding that Sarasota is a city which needs
to zone for aesthetic considerations. Further, the city had introduced
evidence and argument that Sarasota is a city in the same general position
as Miami Beach, a city already determined by the court to be in a proper
posture to utilize aesthetic zoning.2 0 Manipulating the normal constitutional standards related above, the district court of appeal came to the
conclusion that the zoning requirement at issue was valid. In other words
the court easily found that the zoning requirement promoted the health,
27
safety, morals, and general welfare of the public.
In other decisions 1 28 Florida courts did not follow their own rules for
the guidance of their review of zoning requirements, under substantive due

120. Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So.2d 513, 519 (Fla. 1955).

121.
882 (Fla.
122.
123.

Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v. City of Miami Beach, 82 So.2d 880,
1955).
City of Miami Beach v.Wiesen, 86 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1956).
114 So.2d 377 (Fla. App. 1959) (difficult to state which constitution is in

issue; also an equal protection argument). See note 138 infra.

124. Id. at 378.
125. E.g., see City of Miami Beach v. Ocean &Inland Co., 3 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1941).
126. Id. at 367.

127. Apparently using the same standards, the supreme court disagreed on the merits
and quashed the decision of the district court of appeal. Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota,
122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960) (Drew, Thomal and O'Connell, JJ., dissenting). The supreme

court may have given only "lip-service" to its own standards. Of like tenor are such cases
as Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Burk, 114 So.2d 225 (Fla. App. 1959), which follow
the required standards of the supreme court in deciding substantive due process and

equal protection issues related to zoning (both constitutions).

128. See, e.g., Fox v. Bancroft Hotel Assoc., 128 So.2d 771 (Fla. App. 1961). At
issue was substantive due process (FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12 was not specifically cited, however). The case also has an equal protection flavor.
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process. For example, in one case 29 a Miami Beach ordinance prohibited
the use of a stove, hot-plate or like device in any single family unit, containing less than 400 square feet of space. A hotel, which owned and
operated 150 rooms on Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, sued to invalidate
the ordinance as applied to it. Strangely, the court took into account
the identitv of the protagonists for the enactment and enforcement of this ordinance, namely, the Miami Beach Apartment
Association, the contents of the minutes of the city Council of
Miami Beach concerning this ordinance, the arbitrary and nowhere
justified criteria of four hundred (400) square feet of floor space,
the limited application of the ordinance, the effect of the ordinance upon competing groups in the tourist accommodation business, the ... fact that the ordinance cannot be reasonably related
to the police power'3 0
and found that it was "patent and beyond real debate that the sole aim
of the ordinance was to interfere with business competition and the operation of natural economic laws in a discriminatory manner.''13 While the
invalidating factor of economic regulation is a proper one under Florida
decisions 3 2 for the courts to consider, the Third District Court of Appeal's
decision would not seem to have utilized the required standards of the
supreme court in determining the validity of this zoning requirement
under substantive due process. 3
VI.

EMINENT DOMAIN'

34

Since Adams v. Housing Authority of City of Daytona Beach'3" it has
been impossible for local Florida governments to acquire a depressed area,
plan a proper development for the area, rezone under that plan and sell or
lease the project to private enterprise for usage in line with the new zoning.
The theory of the Adams case was that the police power, aided by eminent
domain, is restricted to a "public use." The court admitted that the police
power, exercised by way of a regulatory requirement, can be utilized to abate
a local area's slums. Such ailments can be abated by ordering discontinuance as a nuisance, or by condemnation of the slum housing under eminent
domain, which may leave the land to be developed again by the same owners
who originally permitted it to disintegrate. The key to the Adams case
seemed to be that the state's eminent domain power must be utilized for
129.
130.
131.
132.
(1958).
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. at 773.
Ibid.
See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 12 U.
See notes 120-122 supra.
See generally Urban Renewal, 72
60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952).

HARV.

L.

REV.

MIAMI

L.

504 (1959).

REV.

288, 302
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a "public use" or a "public purpose," and such a public use or purpose will
not be found by the court when property is taken by eminent domain, rezoned and sold or leased to private enterprise for development under a new
plan. The effect of the decision was to deny to local Florida government
federal monies authorized for urban renewal programs; in essence, this has
meant an end to major slum clearance projects in our Florida cities.
In a 1959 decision, Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 13 6 a fairly
good-sized hole was blasted through this constitutional dam. Involved in
the case was an urban renewal law, a special act applicable to Tampa providing for the clearing and redevelopment of slum and blighted areas
legislatively declared to exist in the city. A property owner sued to enjoin
Tampa's Urban Renewal Agency from proceeding with a project covering
an area in which the plaintiff owned property. The plaintiff proceeded with
a galaxy of constitutional arguments.131
Tampa approved a plan for the clearance and redevelopment of a slum
area within the city comprising some forty acres. The redevelopment plan
contemplated the replatting of the entire area and the laying out of an entirely new street plan, including the closing off of some existing streets. The
area would be returned primarily to residential use, consistent with the
residential areas adjoining the project area with the remainder thereof to be
devoted to neighborhood commercial uses necessary to serve the residents
and to general commercial uses. For present purposes this discussion will be
limited to the substantive due process issue-whether or not the eminent
domain power of this state was being utilized for a public use or a public
purpose.
The trial court's findings of fact may be summarized as follows: (1)
the project area was a slum or blighted area which was a breeding place of
disease and crime, requiring a disproportionate expenditure of public funds
to preserve the public health and prevent crime, fire, accidents, and to
supply public services to the residents of the area; further' that the tax income to the city, county and state was out of proportion to the amounts
of public funds required to be expended in servicing the area and that nationally, where slums have been eradicated and the area redeveloped, the tax
income accruing has been approximately seven times greater than when the
area was a slum; (2) the police power of the city was definitely inadequate
136. 115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959)
dissenting).

(Thomas, C.J., and Drew and O'Connell, JJ,

At issue were FLA. CONST. DECL.

OF

RIcHTS

§

1,

12 (substantive due

process); FLA. CONS'r. art. IX, §§ 5 (taxes for county and city purposes), 10 (credit of
state not to bc loaned); FLA. CONs'r. aft. XVI, § 29 (condemnation and compensation).
137. See note 136 suopra. lie attacked tho Urban Renewal Law as "violative of his
right to acquire, possess and protect property, as an unauthorized taking of private property
for private use, and as an unauthorized expenditure of public funds for private use and
gain, contrary to the provisions of §§ 1 and 12, Declaration of Rights, §§ 5 and 10 of

Article 9, and § 29 of Article 16, of the Florida Constitution .

I..."
Id. at 746.
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to accomplish the removal or elimination of the slum conditions because
the area was so deteriorated that mere conservation methods would not accomplish the elimination of slum conditions; the complete replatting and
redevelopment of the land on an area-wide basis was the only feasible
method of slum elimination; (3) private enterprise could not accomplish
redevelopment of the area because of the diversity of ownerships and the
inability of one or more private organizations to obtain all the parcels
therein without the power of eminent domain; in fact, such an endeavor
would not have been profitable for private enterprise to undertake; (4) the
project when completed would fit into the city's general plans of development, improve traffic and safety conditions in the area, and eliminate the
blighted area in question with its disease, crime, fire hazard and other
problems growing out of slum conditions; (5) finally, that the project would
materially benefit, protect, and conserve the health, safety, morals and general welfare of all citizens of the city.
First, the court stated that the police power objective, aided by use
of the eminent domain power, must be utilized for a "public purpose."
Such a public purpose exists when the police power is used to clear slum
areas and construct low-rental public housing thereon, or when it is used
to condemn slum areas and provide thereafter for private development. In
either instance the effect is the removal of a breeding place for crime and
disease, thereby promoting the "health, safety, morals and general welfare"
of the people. The purpose of this law, therefore, was stated to be a "public" one.
The court, without actually deciding that it was necessary to do so,
went on to discuss whether it was also necessary to find that the eminent
domain power is used in aid of a "public use" as well as a "public purpose."
Certainly, the court indicated, ownership of a cleared slum area which remains in public hands, with public housing constructed thereon, even
though the eminent domain power was used to obtain the property, is a
public use" of the property. No constitutional difference was seen in an
urban renewal law. The court indicated that even though incidental benefits will enure to private individuals or corporations under an urban renewal law if slum clearance is the dominant or primary purpose of the enactment, and redevelopment (by private enterprise) of the cleared property
is the subordinate purpose linked to the primary purpose by the necessity
of preventing the recurrence of the slum condition, the plan of slum clearance and redevelopment may be said to be for a public use.
Under the definition 13a given to the words "public use," the Florida
138. "A use to be public must be fixed and definite. It must be one in which the
public, as such, has an interest, and the terms and manner of its enjoyment must be within
the control of the State, independent of the rights of the private owner of the' property
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courts will have a great deal of discretion in determining what is and what
is not a "public use." However, with such urban renewal laws the court
did establish two important requirements: (1) testimony by the local
government in the trial court must indicate that "slum" clearance is very
necessary and is the purpose or objective of the entire project; (2) the evidence should also demonstrate that the major purpose of the slum clearance and redevelopment is for the public benefit, as opposed to private
benefit. 18 9
Insofar as the Adams opinion is concerned, the court definitely over-

ruled Adams to the extent that that decision dealt with "a slum" area not
shown to be reasonably necessary to take under the power of eminent
domain to conserve the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
However, insofar as a "blighted" area is concerned, the Adams opinion

apparently is still good law. In opinion context, a "blighted" area would
seem to be one which local government believes could be used in a more
140
efficient or economical manner.
Recently the First District Court of Appeal, 41 accepted part of the
test for "public purpose" in the Grubstein case. Property owners sued to
obtain a way of necessity across a railroad right of way to reach a highway
under Florida Statutes, chapter 704.142 Among other constitutional arguments the railroad's position was that chapter 704 did not serve a public
purpose as distinguished from a simple "public benefit." The district court
appropriated to the use. The use of property cannot be said to be public if it can be
gainsaid, denied, or withdrawn by the owner. The public interest must dominate the
private gain." Id. at 749, the court quoting from Boyd v. C. L. Ritter Lumber Co., 119
Va. 348, 370, 89 S.E. 273, 279 (1916).
139. This is particularly emphasized in justice Thornal's concurring opinion. The
justice distinguishes thc two cases this way: "Adams dealt with a specific, limited project
which, admittedly, involved the condemnation of a relatively small area of land for inmmediate re-sale to private enterprise for the development of commercial establishments. It
appeared to be an exploitation of governmental power for the benefit of selected individuals.
Unlike the instant case, Adams did not involve extensive legislative and judicial findings
of the existence of slum areas and the contemplated reconversion of those areas into lowcost residential properties." Id. at 752.
140. Florida, therefore, is slowly moving into line with its brother states on the
public purpose or use doctrine. See Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 227
N.Y.S.2d 903 (1962).
141. Stein v. Darby, 126 So.2d 313 (Fla. App.) (Mason, Assoc. J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 134 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1961). At issue were FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 29
(eminent domain): FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHITS §§, 1 (equal protection?), 12 (substantive due process); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (substantive due process).
142. Which in part reads as follows: "Based on public policy . . . a statutory way
of necessity . . . exists when any land . . . outside any municipality which is being used
or desired to be used . . . shall be shut off or hemnmed in by lands . . . of other persons
so that no practicable route of egress or ingress shall be available therefrom to the nearest
practicable public road or private road." FLA. STAT. § 704.01(2) (1961). FLA. STAT.
§ 704.04 (1961) authorizes compensation as follows: "When the owner or owners of
such lands across which a statutory way of necessity . . . is claimed . . . objects or refuses
to permit the use of such way . . . until he receives compensation therefor, then either
party or the board of county commissioners of such county may file suit in the circuit
court . . . in order to determine if the claim for said easement exists, and the amount
of compensation to which said party. is entitled for use of such easement."
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easily found a public purpose in the state's public policy which is favorable
to full utilization of natural resources and which is against the possible loss
of utility in the case of landlocked property. An earlier decision 43 had invalidated a somewhat similar act on the basis that it did not provide for
compensation to the owner across whose land the easement would fall.
The present statute obviated this constitutional obstacle. Citing the Grubstein case language, the district court stated that an incidental private benefit is not determinative of the validity of a government act if the ultimate
objective is a proper public use or purpose.
VII.

44

HEALTH1

The Florida Supreme Court traditionally has permitted the legislature
a wide range of discretion, under substantive due process standards, in testing regulations whose basis is the public health. 1 45 And this has been the
pattern of decision even when the legislative purpose has driven beyond the
40
health objective and has sought to interfere with the so-called free market.
A 196017 decision again1 48 tested the breadth of the legislative
police
power over the milk industry. In this decision, the court determined that
the Florida Milk Commission has the power to require distributors and
producer-distributors to accept any part of the milk produced and delivered
to them by their producers, including milk which the distributors and producer-distributors neither need nor want. Further, the Commission may require the various distributors to pay for the milk at minimum prices fixed
by the Commission. The court noted that "the evils that prompted such
exercise of the police power were the 'unhealthful, unfair, unjust, destructive . . . trade practice,' which had grown up and 'been carried on in the
production, sale and distribution of milk' . . . imperiling the constant supply
of pure and wholesome milk."'149 Therefore, price-fixing, with at least a
nominal relation to public health, is valid in Florida.
Strangely, with reference to a statute 150 whose basis in health was perhaps even more secure than the price-fixing authority of the Milk Com143. South Dade Farms v. B. & L. Farms Co., 62 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1952).
144. See generally Brown, Police Power-Legislation for Health and Personal Safety,
42 llARv. L. REV. 866 (1929).
145. -See, e.g., Moore v. Draper, 57 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
146. E.g., Shiver v. Lee, 89 So.2d 318, 321 (,Fla. 1956) (to provide for an orderly
price structure for the milk industry).
147. Borden Co. v. Odham, 121 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1959) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (on
rehearing, Thomas, J., adhering to his original dissent and Terrell, J., adhering to the
original opinion). At issue were FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIcHrs § 12 and U.S. CoNsr.
amend. XIV (substantive due process); U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8 (interstate commerce
clause). Accord, Foremost Dairies v. Odham, 121 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1959); see Public
Utilities; The Influence of Nebbia v. People on State Regulation, 27 Ky. L.J. 323 (1939).
148. See note 146 supra.
149. 121 So.2d at 632.
150. FLA. STAT. § 465.18(1) (1961).
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mission, the court invalidated.'' The requirement of the statute was
that one who operates a retail drug store must have a licensed pharmacist
in constant supervision of the store while it is open for general business or
while drugs and medical supplies are being compounded or dispensed. The
court admitted the interest in public health of regulating compounding,
dispensing, or selling of drugs and medical supplies, which are potentially
harmful or dangerous to an uninformed or incautious user. Such activity
should only be done under supervision of a licensed pharmacist. However,
the court noted that the requirement of supervision by a licensed pharmacist had, by the statute, been extended to cover all the operations of a drug
store, including those which are unrelated by their nature to the preparation
and sale of controlled drugs and medicines. To the court, it was necessary
for the state to demonstrate the necessity for this supervision over the innocent or innocuous facets of the drug store's business. The state's argument
apparently was that this inclusion was necessary in order to secure efficient
•4-,enforcement of the act.
The court reversed the presumption of validity in stating that "the
limitation [substantive due process] is such that the police power may only
be used so as to interfere with the God-given and constitutionally protected
right of the individual to pursue a lawful business .. .where the public

interest demands [it].' 152 'he court went so far as to state that "the interference with or sacrifice of the private rights must be necessary, i.e., must
be essential, to the reasonable accomplishment of the desired goal."'153 The
court could understand how it would be more "convenient" to ensure that
all controlled drugs and medical supplies are prepared and dispensed only
by licensed pharmacists, by requiring that the entire drug store be supervised by a pharmacist. But the court did not find that it was "necessary."
It did not appear that the other operations of a modem drug store were so
"interrelated and entwined with that part of its business which relates to
the preparation and sale of controlled drugs ...as to make it necessary to
reasonably
impose the requirement of supervision . ..in order to obtain
' 54

successful enforcement of the prime purpose [of the law].'
VIII. SAFETY' 55

Police power regulations dealing with public safety requirements nor151. State v. Leone, 118 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1960) (Thornal, J., concurring only in
the judgment). Undoubtedly at issue, although not cited by the court, was FLA. CONST.
DECL. Or RIGHTS § 12 (substantive due process) and, for some reason, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV (privileges and immunities clause).
152. Id. at 784.
153. Id. at 784-85.
154. Id. at 785.

155. Regulations, having a basis in public safety, normally are validated under substantive due process standards. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 82
Sup. Ct. 987 (1962).
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mally have easy constitutional sailing over the substantive due process
reef. 5 '
In Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. City of Orlando,1 7 common carriers
sued to enjoin the operation of an ordinance' 18 which required the carriers
to obtain permits from the city in order to utilize the city's loading zones.
Certain areas on the streets were designated by the city as "loading zones"
for the loading and unloading of freight vehicles. The plaintiffs had not
obtained the permits, but were using loading zones. The preamble to the
ordinance described the police power objective behind the ordinance in the
following words: "Whereas, the loading and unloading of freight from
trucks constitutes a traffic hazard and impedes the orderly flow of traffic
on or about the streets of Orlando . . . it is the desire of the city . . . to
establish . . . zones for the elimination of said traffic hazards and to expedite the loading and unloading of freight . . . the City Council . . . after
due investigation . . . has found . . . that the establishment of such loading
and unloading zones will eliminate said traffic hazards . . . ." The Second
District Court of Appeal easily determined that the basis of the traffic
ordinance was safety and the ordinance well within the police power. 5 9
A very interesting case of first impression 1 60 involved a Florida statute
which requires that each licensee have his operator's license in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle. The licensee
must display it upon demand of an officer. Municipal police officers were
operating road blocks for the purpose of checking automobile driver's licenses. Each driver was directed to proceed in a line of traffic and then
was requested to exhibit his state driver's license. The plaintiff's substantive
due process argument was that the police power of the state was not broad
enough to validate this restriction on his use of the highways. Not too surprisingly, in view of the police power safety purpose behind the regulation,
the court validated this regulatory activity of police officers. Testimony of
police officers indicated that road blocks are the only practical method to
determine whether or not drivers, whose licenses have been suspended or
156. Sometimes the Florida Supreme Court falls from constitutional grace. See, e.g..
Loftin v. City of Miami, 53 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1951). Generally the Florida Supreme Court
validates safety regulations; e.g., Smith v. Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1957).
157. 113 So.2d 723 (Fla. App. 1959), quashed, 120 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1960). It is
difficult to determine, from the district court opinion, whether federal or Florida constitutional substantive due process is involved. In the supreme court opinion the court did
not disturb the safety police power language of the lower court.
158. Orlando, Fla., Ordinance On Freight Loading Zone Permits.
159. Also involved in the case was whether or not the permit fee was a tax. The
district court overcame this obstacle by determining that the fee did not have a revenue
purpose. It was on this issue that the Florida Supreme Court disagreed; see note 157 supra.
160. City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1959). At issue were U.S.
CONST. amends IV (search and seizure provision), V (provision unclear), XIV (probably
substantive due process); FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS §§ 1 (provision unclear), 22
(search and seizure provision). The opinion is very difficult to analyze.
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revoked, are driving cars on the public highways. The decision is in line
with many others' 0 ' validating police power regulations over the use of
the highways and streets of our state. The court did note that this particular
regulatory effect did not have a very injurious impact upon the use of the
12
highways by the plaintiff.
IX.

MORALS

1 63

The Third District Court of Appeal'6 4 followed earlier Florida decisions
in validating an ordinance 65 which prohibits females employed in drinking
establishments from accepting drinks paid for by the customers. The court
noted the frequency of immoral acts in connection with the operation of
drinking establishments brought about by the mingling and fraternizing by
the female employees and entertainers with the patrons. The test utilized
by the court was typical: " ' whether it [the ordinance] has a rational relation to the public health, morals, safety or general welfare and is reasonably designed to correct a condition adversely affecting the public
good. . . . P ,16
Of similar nature was City of Miami Beach v. State. 6 7 A mandamus
proceeding was brought against the city to require it to issue a liquor license
or permit to the relator to sell alcoholic beverages at the relator's restaurant.
The city had made provision for licenses at restaurants meeting certain
requirements, but refused a license to relator because its restaurant was in
a zoning district in which provision was made for liquor licenses only in
charter clubs and hotels of a certain capacity. Utilizing the presumption of
161. E.g., Thornhill v.Kirkman, 62 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1953).
162. 114 So.2d at 787. In Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1961), one
justification of the state to support the reasonableness of the newest Sunday closing law,

as applied to automobile sales, was the inability of a purchaser to obtain a license tag on
Sundays. The rationale was that Sunday sales encourage dealers 'to conspire with customers
to permit the illegal use of the dealer tag or encourage the buyer of the vehicle to operate
it on the public highways without a proper license tag in violation of the law. Further,
that many safety requirements for the operation of motor vehicles have been enacted by
state law and city ordinances, and city enforcement officers- are not generally working on
those days. Also, it was argued that mechanics are seldom on duty Sundays and legal
holidays to check defective parts on a car. Unscrupulous dealers are thereby enabled to
dispose of unsafe vehicles to unsuspecting buyers with a minimum chance of being apprehended. The court, reversing the usual presumption of validity, simply judicially noticed
facts at variance with the legislatively found facts. The equal protection clauses were also
in issue in the case.
163. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process, 53
Nw. UL. REV. 226, 232 (1958) (liquor industry).
164. City of Miami v. Jiminez, 130 So.2d 109 (Fla. App. 1961). It is difficult to
determine from the opinion what constitutional arguments are involved; however, it is the
judgment of the writers that substantive due process, under the Florida Constitution, was
argued and decided.
165. MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 4-10 (1957).
166. 130 So.2d at 11, the court quoting from City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So.2d

798, 801 (Fla. 1957).
167. 129 So.2d 696 (Fla. App. 1961). Although it was not cited by the court, FLA.
CONST. DECL. OF RIcHTS § 12 (substantive due process) was probably in issue.
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validity, the court upheld the challenged action of the city. Apparently,
evidence was not entered in the trial court to sustain the relator's claim on
unreasonableness and arbitrariness in connection with the city's refusal to
168
license.
In Moore v. Thompson 169 the court invalidated a law which prohibited
the sale or exchange of new or used motor vehicles on Sunday. 70 In the
act's preamble the legislature made various findings of fact as to the necessity for the exercise of the state police power in the statute. One legislative finding was that all offices are closed on Sunday, which would be
open on other days, to buyers to determine whether or not they are being
sold vehicles with clouded titles. The court flatly determined that " ' findings of fact made by the legislature do not carry with them a presumbtion
of correctness if they are obviously contrary to proven and firmly established
truths of which courts may take judicial notice.' ''
The court insisted upon free competition as a "yardstick" standard.
It would seem from reading of the opinion that any reaulation which has
the tendency to prohibit a bisiness activity will have the presumption of
validity thrown aainst it. For example, in the court's treatment of its
judicially noticed facts, it stated that "this Court is presumed to know what
everybody knows-and, it is known bv everybodv that the described offices
are also closed on most Saturdays, holidays not desi ,nated and between late
afternoon and early mominq of the next day."' 172 Tbe court could simply
not see where the thing dealt with, or the method of dealine readily adapts
itself to the perpetration upon the public of deception or fraudulent imposition. The court flatly found that the reaulatory aspects of the statute
were so arbitrary and unreasonable as to condemn it on its face. The fact
that a majority of courts in the United States have 2one the other way on
178
this subject did not deter the court in its judgment.
X. MISCELLANEOUS

Among the legislative findings of fact in the preamble of the Sunday

168. As written by the court, the opinion might be classified better under equal
protection.

169. 126 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1961). It is difficult to state whether substantive due

process or equal protection is the bqsis of the opinion.
170. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-295.
171. 126 So.2d at 549-50, the court quoting from Seagrams Distillers Corp. v. Ben
Greene, Inc., 54 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1951). Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d
680 (Fla. 1954), Was cited in connection with the court's treatment of legislative findings of
fact, Generally, the. law runs the other way; see Biklk, Judicial Determination of Questions
of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV.
6, 18-19 (1924).
172. 126 So.2d at 550.
173. See Sunday Laws, 25 So. CAL. L. REV. 131 (1951), on this general subject,
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closing law, tested in Moore v. Thompson,17 4 were the following. "(2) . . . it
is the policy of our laws to encourage the obtaining of public liability insurance by all automobile owners . . . and such insurance cannot readily be
obtained on [Sundays] ....
(6) Sales of motor vehicles on [Sundays] ...
result in increased costs to buyers for the reason that if only one (1) or two
(2) dealers operate on Sundays . . . they gain a little extra business from
other dealers who, for self-preservation, will be forced to engage in sales on
the same days with resultant increased overhead costs, dissatisfied employees
and higher automobile prices ....
(7) . . . polls taken in Florida [indicate]
that more than ninety (90%) per cent of the new and used automobile
dealers are opposed to the sale of motor vehicles on Sundays . . . .. 75None
of these legislative findings of fact were adequate for the supreme court,
which invalidated the law by taking judicial notice of contrary findings of
fact. A healthy dislike for regulations affecting private enterprise seemed to
be the basis of the opinion. The court simply found that the law was
"unreasonable."

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS"'
I.

ADMINISTRATIvE LAW

17 7

The supreme court, in Foremost Dairies v. Odham, 1 78 apparently drew
a distinction between the rule-making power of Florida agencies and their
order-making power, insofar as procedural due process requirements are concerned. The court stated that "when the Commission has established a general rule or when the Commission has complied with the statute [providing
for reasonable notice and hearing], it is not essential that a hearing be held
to support every order it [the Commission] promulgates."'1 79 Normally,
procedural due process requires full notice and hearing when the ordermaking power of an agency is exercised; with reference to certain types of
regulations the same procedures are necessary. 180
A. Hearing
In a 1960 case'"' the court undertook to solve the problem which
arises where no "ground rules" are prescribed by the agency for conducting
a hearing (here incident to a price fixing order). The statute did not re174. 126 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1961).
175. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-295, at 1006.
176. Criminal and civil court p)rocedural niceties have been transferred to other articles
in this Survey.
177. See FORKosCe, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 28-29 (1956).
178. 121 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1959).
179. Id. at 639. However, this language is weakened by the fact that the court
found that the appellants in the case had reasonable notice and a full opportunity to be
heard.
180. Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) with 150
East 47th St. Corp. v. Creedon, 162 F.2d 206 (Emer. Ct. App. 1947).
181. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Odham, 121 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1959).
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quire any particular rules for conducting hearings;18 2 however, it did require
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. A notice of the public
hearing was given and the hearing was held; the appellant was represented
but did not offer testimony or raise any objection to the evidence which
was offered. Appellant argued that there were no procedural rules adopted
by the agency for the hearing and that the procedure followed made it
impossible to provide a sufficient record for judicial review.
The answer by the court was short. "[H]earings by administrative
boards are not required to be conducted with all the dignity and decorum
with which judicial hearings are conducted. Certainly, they should be orderly
and conducted in a manner to impress the public that an honest effort is
being made to get at the truth ...."18- The fact that the immaterial evidence was offered did not seem to be harmful.
In Jones v. Board of Control,184 a former faculty member of the University of Florida sued for breach of contract by the Board of Control,
which had terminated his employment on the ground that he had breached
a rule of the Board in filing as a candidate for circuit judge. The contract
between the parties was evidenced by a document designated "notice of
contract for academic staff." This document included the provisions of the
Constitution of the University of Florida as well as the rules promulgated
by the Board. Article XV, section 5, of the Constitution of the University
of Florida provides as follows:
Dismissal of a member of the Academic staff .

may not be ef-

fected except for serious cause and on the basis of written and
specific charges . .

.

.In answer to such charges the faculty mem-

ber shall have a hearing before a committee of the faculty appointed by the President. Opportunity shall be given the accused
to challenge for cause the appointment of any faculty member ....
At this hearing and at any hearings of its own that the Board ...
may wish to conduct, the defendant shall be allowed the benefit of
counsel . .

.

.Except in cases of flagrant offense, dismissal shall

not become effective until at least sixty days after action by the
Board of Control. In case of flagrant offense the President may
suspend a member of the academic staff from performance of his
duties and, after an expeditious hearing, recommend immediate
dismissal to the Board ....When the dismissal is ordered in such

cases by the Board of Control it shall be effective at once.
The professor insisted that he was denied administrative procedural
due process because of the failure of the university to meet the specific
182.

FLA.

STAT.

§ 501.06 (1961).

183. 121 So.2d at 642.
184. 131 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1961).
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requirements of article XV, section 5. The professor argued that whether
or not his actions were characterized "serious cause" or "flagrant offense"
the university did not follow the procedures in article XV, section 5, because he was dismissed before any hearings were held at all.
The Florida Supreme Court quickly overcame this obstacle by treating
the professor's admitted violation of the Board's rule as a breach of contract. The apparent meaning was that, since the professor breached the contract, the university did not have to follow the procedural requirements
of article XV, section 5.15

The significance of the decision is that the

court has seriously weakened the procedural rights of public employees
hired by the state under term contracts.180
B.

Time of Hearing

An action was brought by a taxpayer against the county collector of
taxes to enjoin the collection on the ground that assessments of the taxpayer's property were illegal. 187 A statute provided that no assessment should
be held invalid unless suit is instituted within sixty days from the time
the assessment becomes final. The problem was whether the taxpayer was
prohibited from instituting suit until the assessment became final, even
though he had exhausted all of his administrative remedies prior to the
date on which the assessment became final. The court construed the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies so that a party will not be
required to take "vain and useless steps in the expenditure of the administrative remedy in order to perfect the right to seek judicial redress.'1 88 The
court then construed the statute to avoid the constitutional problem
entirely.
C. Notice'8 9
The First District Court of Appeal undertook the problem of notice
requirements under procedural due process. 9 0 A statute provided that be185. An aromtient cnu be made that this is dubious under federal law. See Shcllev
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), under which one can argue that s~ate court enforcement
of contract law is state action for oirposes of the U.S. CoNs'r. amend. XIV. See also

Slochower v. Board of Educ. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
186. Florida law has gcnerally given nublic emplovees the benefits of procedural due
process; see, e.g., Laney v. Holbrook, 8 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1942). Procedural due process
reouires that agencies follow procedural rules emb-dded in Florida law. A federal case
with a constitutional air about it-is Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See also
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
187. Chatlos v. Overstrcet, 124 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1960). At issue were FLA. CONsT.
DECLI. OF RIcTS
4" (courts are open statement) and § 12 (procedural due process).
§ .12 was not specifically cited.
188. Id. at 3.
189. See, for both notice and hearing requisities, Forkosch, ADMINiSrRATIVF LAW

54-77 (1956).
190. Crone v. Peples, 124 So.2d 876 (Fla. App. 1960) (Sturgis, J., concurring with
opinion), cert. denied, 129 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1961). Procedural due process may have been
in issue. If not, the case may only involve statutory construction.
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fore the Director of the State Beverage Department could revoke or suspend the license of any licensee he should give the licensee a written statement of the cause of revocation or suspension of the license. In this case,
the notice was signed by an attorney for the Department, rather than by
the Director. The court required that notice of the charge had to be made
by the specifically authorized competent authority.'
D. Hearing Examiners
A real estate broker sought review of a final order of the Florida Real
Estate Commission suspending his license. 19 2 Pursuant to statute, 193 an examiner was appointed to take testimony upon the issues made by the information and the petitioner's answer. The testimony was taken, transcribed
and returned to the Commission. A hearing was held by the Commission,
briefs submitted, and thereafter, the final order suspending petitioner's license was entered by the Commission.
The broker argued a denial of procedural due process because: (1)
an examiner heard and reported the evidence; (2) the examiner failed to
prepare and submit a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law
to the Commission; and (3) the Commission entered its order without
having heard the testimony or having had the benefit of the examiner's
report. However, the statute required the examiner to -receive the evidence
and objections thereto and transcribe it and report the testimony to the
Commission. This was done. The petitioner had full opportunity to be
beard, notice, and the right to cross examine and to present testimony.
Also the proceedings were conducted. in an atmosphere which was not
prejudicial. The court believed that procedural due process requirements
94
had been observed.
191. However, the court believed that the Director, by proceeding with the hearing,
had adopted as his own the charges contained in the notice as well as the notice itself.
Also, since the licensee had failed to make timely objection, he was deemed to have waived
the procedural defect.
192. Jonas v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 123 So.2d 264 (Fla. App. 1960). At issue,
although not cited specifically by the court, was FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RiGHTS § 12
(administrative procedural due process).
193. FLA. STAT. § 475.27 (1961).

194. A waiver of the procedural due process argument was also noted. Moore v.
Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 121 So.2d 196 (Fla. App. 1960) (at issue may have been
procedural due process; or the case may simply relate a statutory construction point),
involved a somewhat analagous problem. By statute (supra note 193) an examiner for

the Florida Real Estate Commission has to receive the evidence offered, together with

the obejctions thereto, and report the evidence and objections to the Commission. In this
particular license revocation proceeding, the broker was not represented by an attorney
at the time of the taking of the evidence before the examiner. Apparently there were
instances in which the broker accepted objections of the attorney for the Commission as

rulings against testimony the broker wished to enter. However, the court found that there
was no reversible error because the broker was afforded opportunity to offer "any and
all evidence." The court did note, however, the duty of "quasi-judicial" bodies to afford
a "fair and complete hearing to those accused," as well as to conduct the proceedings so
that the record affirmatively shows that the hearing meets all the requirements of law.
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E. Compulsory Process
In 1960, the First District Court of Appeal flatly declared under
Florida administrative procedural due process that in a "quasi judicial
proceeding" due process is denied when a referee denies the right to compulsory attendance of witnesses to a party. 195 In the case the petitioner
sought review of an order of the Florida Industrial Commission which
had denied unemployment compensation benefits. Florida law authorized the Commission and its referees to issue subpoenas to compel the
attendance of witnesses and production of books. Prior to the taking of
testimony at the hearing before the referee, the petitioner requested the
referee to issue a witness subpoena. Petitioner's witness would have testified as to whether or not he was guilty of misconduct connected with
his work. They were fellow employees who "ordinarily would be very
reluctant to testify voluntarily against the interest of their employer."19 ,
Under these circumstances the district court required the right to compulsory process.
II.

197
CLARITY 1

Under federal and Florida constitutional law"' procedural due process
requires that legislative law be written in clear enough style and form that
a reasonable man will know whether or not he is in violation of it.
A. Civil Law
In Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction,'9 9 a Florida schoolteacher
contended that the following statutory oath was unconstitutional:
I, .. ., a citizen of the State of Florida . . . do hereby solemnly
swear or affirm that I will support the Constitution . ..;that I

am not a member of the Communist Party; that I have not and
will not lend my aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the
Communist Party; that I do not believe in the overthrow of the
Government . . . by force or violence; that I am not a member

of any organization or party which believes in or teaches, directly
or indirectly, the overthrow of the Government .... 200

Under Florida law this oath must be filed with the employing governmental agency prior to the approval of any salary voucher and any person
The court did require that examiners appointed pursuant to the statute should announce,
and make the announcement a part of the record, in all cases where the broker is not
represented by counsel, that the examiner will receive all evidence offered and will record
it together with any objections to it.
195. Drogaris v. Martine's, Inc., 118 So.2d 95 (Fla. App. 1960). At issue was FLA.
CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12 (administrative procedural due process).
196. Id. at 97.
197. See Collins, Unconstitutional Uncertainty, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 195 (1955) (a
fine article).
198. See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 158, 179 (1954).
199. 125 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1960).
200. FLA. STAT. § 876.05 (1961).
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will be discharged who refuses to subscribe to the oath. The Florida court
wisely required scienter or knowledge in the oath-taker. The court also
construed the word "lend" in the oath to mean "lent." On review by
the Supreme Court, the Florida court's approach was found to be invalid. 20 1 In essence, the Supreme Court sharply disagreed with the position of the Florida court that "there could be no doubt in the minds
of anyone who can read English as to the requirements of the statute
and the effect of a failure to comply. ' 2 2 Those who take the oath must
swear that they have not, in the past, knowingly lent their "aid," or "support," or "advice," or "counsel," or "influence" to the Communist Party.
To the Supreme Court, a perjury prosecution could plague the oath-taker
who simply voted for a candidate supported by the Party. The oath words
were held constitutionally vague.
B. Criminal Law
Typical Florida court language, defining clarity requirements of procedural due process in criminal law is as follows: "[The law] . . . must
be sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct or conditions
required or forbidden, to prescribe the elements of the offense with reasonable certainty, and make known to those to whom it applies what conduct on their part will render them liable for its penalties .... [or] .. .
statutory language that conveys a definite warning as to proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices satisfies due
process." 20a
Fairly typical of the problems arising in procedural due process and
clarity was State v. Barone.20 4 In this case defendants were prosecuted
under Florida Statutes, sections 828.21 and 828.19. Section 828.21(1)
states:
Any person who shall commit any act, which causes or tends to
cause, or encourage any person under the age of eighteen years to
201. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 82 Sup. Ct. 275, 280-81 (1961). The
issue was whether Florida could compel public servants to swear that they had ever
knowingly lent their aid, support, advice, counsel, or influence to the Communist Party.
The Supreme Court neatly dissected the Florida court's position by drawing from the
statutory words a galaxy of meanings.
202. 125 So.2d at 558.
203. City of St. Petersburg v. Calbeck, 114 So.2d 316, 320 (Fla. App. 1959). In
this case a St. Petersburg ordinance forbade "disorderly conduct." The court apparently
was satisfied by the common law definition of, disorderly conduct, for example, that disorderly conduct generally means some act which tends to breach the peace. It is obviously
impossible in an ordinance of this type to itemize all of the acts which would constitute
disorderly conduct. The question as to whether a particular act is disorderly conduct
depends on the facts in the particular case, and in the determination of this question not
"only the nature of the particular action should be considered but also the time and place
of its occurrence as well as all surrounding circumstances." Id. at 319.
204. 124 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1960). At issue were FLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (legislative
power-delegation);

FLA. CONST. DECL.

OF

RiCHTS § 11

clarity); and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (due process-clarity).

(notice),

§

12 (due process-
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become a delinquent or dependent child, as defined under the
laws of Florida, or which act contributes thereto, or any person
who shall by act . . . induce or endeavor to induce any such person ...to become or to remain a dependent or delinquent child,

as defined under the laws of the state, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Section 828.19 reads as follows: "In all cases where any child shall be a
dependent or delinquent child, as defined under the laws of Florida, any
person or persons who shall by any act encourage, cause, or contribute
to the dependency or delinquency of such child ...shall be guilty . ..."
In neither section is the meaning of "delinquent child" defined. Else-

where, however, in the Florida Statutes "delinquent child" is defined as
a child who "commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation
occurred; or is incorrigible; or is a persistent truant from school; or who
is beyond the control of the child's parent . . .or who associates with
criminals, reputed criminals, or vicious or immoral persons .... ,201

While the legislature did not specifically define the words "delinquent
child" in the criminal statute, the court held the statute clear, under procedural due process, by reference to a civil statute which does define the
words. The fact that the legislature in the criminal statutes did not specifically incorporate the definition in the civil statute by reference did not
inhibit the court.
In State v. Hooten,20 6 the district court resorted to Florida civil law
decisions to aid it in interpreting a criminal law. Florida Statutes, section
839.07, reads as follows:
It is unlawful for any ...officer of this state ...to bid or enter

into, or be in any way interested in, a contract for the working of
any public road or street, the construction or building of any
bridge, the erecting or building of any house, or for the performance of any other public work in which the said officer was a
party to the letting, and any person upon conviction thereof shall
be punished ....

The circuit court ruled that this section contained no language prohibiting
the sale of land by a public official to the unit of government which he
served. Therefore, the question was whether the sale by a county commissioner to the county of land in which the commissioner had an interest,
the land to be used for the performance of a public work, constituted a
criminal offense. The district court's authority in ans wering this question
came from civil cases which had construed and applied the section with
205. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(11) (1961).
206. 122 So.2d 336 (Fla. App. 1960). At issue, although not specifically cited, was
FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS §

12 (due process-clarity).
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reference to land purchases. According to these cases, sale by a public
official of land which he owns to the agency, of which he is an official,
falls within the prohibitory provisions of the statute. It was held that
the statute, as construed, conveyed a definite warning as to proscribed
conduct, when measured by "common understanding and practices." Therefore, "public work" in the criminal statute, includes public activities which
are not "spelled out" in the statute. The words, according to the district
court, were meant by the legislature to comprehend a "variety of public
works activities in which a public officer might seek to utilize his office
20 7
for private gain."
III.

PRESUMPTIONS

20 8

In City of Coral Gables v. Brasher,20 9 the court took up statutory
presumptions. The suit was for declaratory decree to entitle the plaintiff
to a pension from the city for a disability suffered in the line of duty. A
law stated that any "condition or impairment of health of . . . police
officers .. .caused by tuberculosis, hypertension, heart disease or hardening of the arteries, resulting in . . .disability shall be presumed to have
been suffered in line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent
evidence .... ,,210 The plaintiff desired a pension based upon a disability, incurred in the line of duty, because of a heart condition. The
city took the position that the plaintiff was not entitled to the presumption
created by the statute. Since the statute provided that the presumption
could be overcome by competent evidence (i.e., was not "absolute"), the
court held that the statute created no more than a prima facie presumption which may be overcome by testimony. A "conclusive presumption"
would have been invalid as well as one which embodied no "rational connection between the fact proven or to be proven and the ultimate fact
presumed." Due process was not denied.
211

EQUAL PROTECTION
The equal protection provision of the Florida Constitution would
207. Id. at 340. Tracey v. State, 130 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1961), also involved a clarity
problem. The defendant had been convicted for violating obscenity statutes. The court
noted that in addition to the words "immoral, degrading, sadistic and masochistic" the
statutes described the prohibited matter with the words "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
and indecent," which were approved in the case of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957). Further, that the information under which the defendant was charged used only
the descriptive words approved in Roth. This eliminated the clarity issue for the Florida
court.
208. See generally Morgan, Federal Constitutional Limitations Upon Presumptions
Created By State Legislation, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 323 (1934).
209. 120 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1960). At issue were U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (equal
protection and procedural due process) and FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS §§ 1, 12
(same).
210. FLA. STAT. § 185.34 (1961).
211. The position of the Supreme Court in dealing with economic legislation under
the Equal Protection Clause, is well stated in ROTTSCTIAEFER, THE CONSTITUTION AND
SocIo-EcoNOsMIc CHANGE 154-55 (1948).
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seem to be in the Declaration of Rights, section 1, which states that:
men are equal before the law .

. . ."

"All

In manipulating this clause Florida

courts approach the review of legislative classification problems in quite
similar fashion to their review of the legislative police power under substantive due process. In both situations the courts demand a "reasonable"
basis for the legislative judgment. Here, as with substantive due process
problems, the presumption of legislative validity at times is not followed by
Florida courts.
Probably no legislation enjoys a classification, under which the law
applies to all people under every circumstance imaginable. Therefore,
since some legislative classifications are valid, and since some are invalid,
is to determine the rationale
the problem for the attorney and the legislator
21 2
which seems attractive to the Florida courts..
I.

RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS

2 13

Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners 14 presented the only noneconomic issue under equal protection during the Survey years. The
defendants purchased a lot in a subdivision. At the time of purchase there
were on record certain restrictive covenants affecting the property's sale
and occupancy. Among these were the following:
'Ownership.

No lot . . . shall be sold . . . to anyone not a

member in good standing of Sunset Islands Property Owners . . .
Provided, however, that nothing in this covenant contained shall
prevent any corporation, a majority of the stock in which is owned
by members in good standing of Sunset Island Property Owners,
Inc., from owning or leasing any such property.
'Occupancy.

No lot . . . shall be used or occupied by anyone

not a member in good standing of Sunset Islands Property Owners,
Inc.'215
When the defendants purchased, the by-laws of the corporation provided that no member of the corporation "would, prior to the year 1966,
sell or lease any property in the subdivision to any person 'not of the
Caucasian race, or who is not a Gentile, or who has been convicted of a
The by-laws also stated that "'the only ground upon
felony . ...
"210
212. At times no rationale seems apparent; see Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law,
14 U. MIAMlI L. REV. 501, 512-15 (1960) (a rough year for the legislature under equal

protection).
213. Compare, e.g., Martin v. Walton, 82 Sup. Ct. 1 (1961) (a non "civil rights"
decision under equal protection) with, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (a "civil
rights" decision under equal protection).
214. 116 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1959). At issue, perhaps, was only U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV (equal protection).
215. Id. at 623.

216. Ibid.
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which an owner or lessee of property on said Islands may be denied membership in this corporation shall be that the applicant is not a Gentile
or is not of the Caucasian race or has been convicted of a felony.' "217
When the defendant, a Jew, purchased the property the recorded
restriction required that he be a member of the corporation. The membership application blank contained an excerpt from the by-laws. However,
he constructed an expensive home on the island and assumed occupancy.
The corporation filed suit to compel him to vacate, alleging that he was
not a member of the corporation. Prior to filing of the complaint the
by-laws had been amended by elimination of the references to Caucasians,
Gentiles and felons. In lieu thereof, a substitution was made that "'the
qualifications for membership . . .shall be that a member be of good
moral character .. .an owner or lessee, or one who proposes to become
an owner or lessee, of property on Sunset Islands .... "21 Pending the
suit the defendant, pleading himself to be of good moral character, applied
for membership and was rejected.
Defendant argued that the restriction requiring membership in the
corporation, supplemented by the by-laws requiring a member to be a
Caucasian or Gentile, denied him the equal protection of the law.
According to the
enant had the effect
by a Jew. Following
order to enforce the
under the Fourteenth

Florida Supreme Court, the 25-year restrictive covof prohibiting purchase or occupancy of the land
Shelley v. Kraemer,219 the court believed that an
restrictive covenant would amount to state action
Amendment.

The court cautioned that it was not holding the requirement of membership in the corporation, and the limiting of membership to people of
good moral character, a prohibited restraint on alienation. Required membership "untainted by religious exclusions might in another setting be
perfectly legitimate."
II.

OTHER PROBLEMS IN EQUAL PROTECTION

A.

2 20

Taxes and Fees

At issue in State v. City of Pensacola22' was the constitutionality of
a statute granting exemption from taxation to the City of Pensacola. The
state alleged that there were some forty municipal corporations engaged
in the sale and distribution of electricity and natural gas. With the
217. Ibid.
218. Ibid.
219. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

220. See notes 211, 213 supra.

221. 126 So.2d 566 (Fla. 1961) (O'Connell, J., concurring specially). At issue
were U.S. CONST. amend. XIV and FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § I (equal protection).

734
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exception of Pensacola all other cities had to pay a state tax upon gross
receipts of public service corporations. The court granted a vigorous presumption of validity in favor of the power of the legislature to select
subjects of taxation and to provide for exemptions from taxation, under
the equal protection clauses.22 2 Further, the court correctly stated that the
equal protection inhibitions do not constitute a restraint upon the state
in the control of its own municipalities. The statutory gift to Pensacola
was, therefore, valid.
Insofar as tax assessment is concerned the Florida rule may be otherwise.

In Cassady v. Consolidated Naval Stores Co.,2 2 3 the supreme court

invalidated a statute providing for separate assessment and taxation of mineral rights "when owned in fee simple separately from the ownership of the
surface of the land." If a return was not made by the owner of the subsurface rights, a duty was imposed upon the tax assessor to assess such
rights. However, this separate assessment was only required when the
owner of a record interest in the land filed a written request for it. The
court took the position that if property owned by one person is assessed
for taxation while property of other persons, having the same classification
and subject under the law to be assessed for taxes, is not, then the failure
of an assessing officer to include the latter's property in the assessment
roll operates as denial of equal protection of the law. In view of the
possibilities of conspiracy between owners of various interests in land, the
decision is attractive.

224

222. In line with Supreme Court decisions; see, e.g., Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358
U.S. 522 (1959).
223. 119 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1960). It is difficult to determine which constitution is
in issue.
224. Accord, Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946). One
more decision, Segal v. Simpson, 121 So.2d 790 (Fla. 1960), involved a tax or fee and
the federal equal protection inhibition. At issue was section 561.34(13) (a) of Florida
Statutes, which laid a license fee of $25.00 a day upon any person operating a "commercial
establishment catering to the public by offering . . .live entertainment" and who permitted
"consumption of alcoholic beverages on the premises" while not holding a beverage license
penmitting such consumption. The case involved, of course, the so-called "bottle clubs."
'Ihe decision is difficult to classify; it could be classified under substantive due process or
equal protection. At any rate, the Florida Supreme Court believes that these fees totaling
"approximately ten times the license requirements of an ordinary bar-restaurant in the
same locality" illustrated a "sharp discrimination." In fact, the statute imposed on one
class of "drink-permitting establishments fees up to $7,825 for a year's operation," but
the statute failed to include "other establishments similar in all respects except that they
do not offer live entertainment."
The court believed that this contrast in treatment indicated a policy of "exclusion
rather than regulation" of a less favored class of business. Further, that a business cannot
be prohibited under the power to license when it is "not per se dangerous, immoral or
contrary to well established public policy." This last language would seem to be related
to substantive due process requirements.
The court is not accurate in its evaluation of Fourteenth Amendment necessities. See
Sholley, Equal Protection in Tax Legislation, 24 VA. L. REV. 229, 388 (1938).
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B. Zoning
Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota225 typifies the equal protection problem in certain areas of zoning. The petitioner was engaged in the business
of building and leasing to advertisers billboards of three hundred square feet.
The petitioner alleged that the dimensions of the billboards were standard
throughout the United States, making possible the preparation of posters
at reduced cost. The city enacted an ordinance limiting the size of the
signs in business and industrial districts, putting them in two classifications:
"point of sale" and "non-point of sale." In the first class, wall signs were
authorized to be any size. In the second class, wall signs were limited to
three hundred square feet, all other signs to one hundred eighty square feet.
The object of the ordinance was aesthetic values.
The court read the ordinance so that "at the point of sale the wall
sign could be of any size desired, but all other signs could be but 180
square feet, while at another place a wall sign could be only 300 square
feet and roof and other signs only 180 square feet.

' 226

While not dis-

counting the aesthetic rationale, the court determined for itself whether
or not the ordinance was "unreasonable and discriminatory." The court
simply refused to validate an ordinance under which "a wall sign 300
square feet in size at non-point of sale would not offend [aesthetic values]
while a sign of the same size on one of petitioner's billboards would. '227
To the court, the ordinance was not designed to preserve a "pattern
228
calculated to protect" the city's beauty.
In one opinion 229 the District Court of Appeal for the Third District
applied the "fairly debatable" rule to an equal protection problem in
zoning. That is, when an ordinance may be said to be fairly debatable as
to its necessity and reasonableness, the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authorities, and invalidate. The case related
to an ordinance restricting the height of buildings, as applied to the plaintiff's property. The district court found there was no evidence that the
application of the zoning ordinance to plaintiff's property was "particular or peculiar in any way to that property or distinguished from other
property covered by the same provision of the ordinance of which complaint is made." The record did reveal a great deal of testimony as to
whether the ordinance in question was wise or unwise. The court held
that the fairly debatable rule controlled and validated.
225. 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960). But c.f. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949). It is difficult to determine whether substantive due process or equal
protection is the basis for the decision in the principal case.
226. Id. at 614.
227. Ibid.
228. This decision disagreed with the Second District Court of Appeal in City of
Sarasota v. Sunad, Inc., 114 So.2d 377 (Fla. App. 1959), which granted the ordinance
a healthy presumption of validity under City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So.2d 798 (Fla.

1957).
229. Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Burk, 114 So.2d 225 (Fla. App. 1959).
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C. Sunday Laws
In 1960, the authors stated that it would appear impossible for the
legislature to enact a valid Sunday law.23 0 In 1961, the supreme court
underlined the accuracy of this prognostication.2 31 At issue was the constitutionality of a blue law which made it unlawful for any person or firm to
engage in the business of buying, selling, trading or exchanging new or
used cars, "on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, or on
,232
"...
legal holidays .
In the preamble to the act, the legislature made various findings of
fact as to the necessity for this exercise of the state's police power. For
example, the legislature found the following "facts": (1) the business of
selling automobiles is "a distinct type of business different from all other
businesses"; (2) if "unscrupulous" dealers can dispose of vehicles on the
forbidden days they can dispose of vehicles with clouded titles and make
"fast deals" in view of the fact that government offices are closed; (3) it
is the policy of Florida to encourage the obtaining of public liability insurance by automobile owners and that such insurance cannot be readily
obtained on these days; (4) a purchaser cannot obtain a license tag on
Sunday or holidays; this encourages the dealer to conspire with the customer to permit the illegal use of a dealer tag, and so on; (5) state and
city enforcement offices are not open; therefore, cars cannot be inspected
on the day on which they are purchased; (6) mechanics are not on duty
to check defective parts of the car; (7) sales of cars on these days result
in increased cost to buyers because if only a few dealers operate they gain
a little extra business from other dealers who, for self-preservation are forced
to engage in sales on the same days with resultant increased overhead costs.
Again, the Florida Supreme Court stated that it is necessary that
there be a valid and substantial reason to make such laws operate only
upon certain classes rather than generally upon all. Further, the court
admitted that legislative findings of fact are presumed to be correct, but
stated that they are not binding upon the courts under all conditions.
Courts will abide by such legislative findings unless they are clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted. The court then determined that the
legislative findings of fact in the preamble to this blue law were "obviously
contrary to proven and firmly established truths of which Courts may
take judicial notice." And this, notwithstanding the fact that constitutional
233
law elsewhere has gone the other way on similar facts.
The dissenting justices, Terrell and Roberts, pointed out that the
230.
(1960).
231.
232.
233.

See Alloway, Florida Coristitutional Law, 14 U.

MIAMI

Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1961).
Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-295.
E.g., see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).

L.

REV.

501, 514
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presumption of validity means in essence, "that all doubts as to the constitutionality are to be resolved by the courts in favor of the validity of
the statute." The justices easily found that there were "valid and substantial" reasons for the restraint imposed in this blue law upon the automobile
business. Further, in his separate dissenting opinion, Justice Terrell strongly
indicated that the members of his court should never invalidate statutes

"because they do not square with our political, economic, social or other
peculiar views."
D.

Professional Requirements

In State ex rel. Israel v. Canova,23 4 an applicant to be a pharmacist
was denied permission to take the examination by the Florida Board of
Pharmacy. The statute required that to be eligible for examination appli28
cants had to be graduates of an accredited four-year college of pharmacy.
However, the statute excepted those pharmacists already licensed. The
plaintiff had obtained a professional degree upon completion of a twoyear training course of study in another state and had been licensed in
that state since 1925. At issue, of course, was the validity under equal
protection of this "grandfather clause." The court again reiterated its
test that a legislative classification must have some " 'just relation to, or
reasonable basis in, essential differences of conditions and circumstances
with reference to the the subject regulated, and should not be merely
27
arbitrary .... , ,231 Further, unlike its approach in Moore v. Thompson, 3
the court admitted that it had nothing to do with the "expediency or
wisdom of the standard of qualification fixed, nor with the tests adopted
for ascertaining the same." The legislative theory was that those individuals already registered had proven an evidence of skill and competency
equivalent to a diploma from college in Florida. The fact that plaintiff
had exhibited skill elsewhere did not suffice to make the law, as applied
to him, "arbitrary." Further, all who entered the profession after passage
28
of the statute are subject to the same conditions.

234. 123 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 608 (1961). At issue
were U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (equal protection and privileges and immunities clause)
and the FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12 (probably substantive due process). Kotch
v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) is in accord with the principal
case.
235. FLA. STAT. § 465.071(b) (1961).
236. 123 So.2d at 673, the court quoting from Eslin v. Collins, 108 So.2d 889, 891
(Fla. 1959).
237. Note 231 supra.
238. Various equal protection arguments were also made in the following cases:
State v. Dade County, 127 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1961); City of Coral Gables v. Brasher, 120
So.2d 5 (Fla. 1960); and State v. Cochran, 114 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1959).
One recent Florida equal protection decision reached the Supreme Court. Hoyt v.
Florida, 82 Sup. Ct. 159 (1961) (validation of Florida's statute authorizing women
volunteers for jury duty).
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LEGISLATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
I.

ARTICLE

III,

SECTION

16

This section of our constitution states that "Each law enacted in the
Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected
therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no
law shall be amended or revised by reference to its title only; but in such
case the act as revised or section, or subsection of a section ...
shall be reenacted and published . ... "

as amended,

The court has recognized several objects behind this provision in our
constitution: (1) to prevent the practice of stating two unrelated matters
in one bill ("log rolling"); (2) to prevent surprise or fraud by notice in
the title; (3) to apprise the people of the legislation's subject so that
23 9
they may have an opportunity to be heard.
In State v. Graessle,240 at issue was the validity of an act,241 the title
to which was as follows:
An Act amending chapter 33, Florida Statutes, by providing for
abolishing the civil courts of record in all counties of this state
having a population of not less than three hundred thousand . . .
inhabitants as determined by the latest . . . census, and not

having home rule under the constitution ....
242 which had established civil courts of
This law amended an earlier on1e
record and which had provided that its provisions did not apply to the
civil court of record of Duval County, which had been established by
other statutes. The amendment abolished the civil court of record in all
counties having population of not less than 300,000 and not having home
rule. The effect of the amendatory act, if valid, would be to also abolish

the civil court of record of Duval County.

inadequate under article III, section 16.

The court found the title

There was nothing in the title

of the amendatory act to place either the members of the legislature or
the people on notice that it abolished the civil court of record of Duval

County. This was because the act which was sought to be amended
stated that it did not apply to the Duval County court. The legislative
mistake was the failure to give notice, in the title of the amending act,

that this particular county court was to be abolished.
244
In another case,243 the court cast doubt upon the validity of an act
239. See State ex rel. Flink v. Canova, 94 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1957).
240. 114 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1959) (Thornal, J., concurring specially; O'Connell, J.,
concurring; and Terrell, J., dissenting).
241. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-516.
242. FLA. STAT. § 33.01 (1957).
243. Segal v. Simpson, 121 So.2d 790 (Fla. 1960). The court did not actually decide
this point.

244. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-316.
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with the following title: "An Act relating to the administration of the
alcoholic beverage law; amending Sections 561.17, 561.18, 561.27 and
561.34 Florida Statutes; setting an effective date." The act itself stated
that any person operating an establishment, catering to the public by
offering live entertainment, which shall "permit consumption of alcoholic
beverages on the premises and does not hold a valid beverage license . . .
permitting [such] consumption . . . shall pay a license fee of twenty-five
($25.00) dollars per day . . . in addition to any other license fees now
required by law." While refraining from deciding whether or not the title
of the act was valid under article III, section 16, the court did state that
it was "impelled to observe that it approaches dangerously a form that
might, upon scrutiny, result in a declaration that it offends against [this
constitutional requirement] Y"245
II.

ARTICLE III, SECTION

20

This section states: "The Legislature shall not pass special or local
laws in any of the following . . . cases: . . . regulating the jurisdiction and
duties of any class of officers . . . regulating the fees of officers of the
State and County . .. ."
The court has validated, any number of times, "population" acts
applicable to counties having stated populations, when the court believed
that the classification of the act had a reasonable relationship to its subject
matter and purpose. 24 6 In such a context, the court has generally characterized the act as a "general law." This test indicates that the court
will determine for itself whether or not there is a rational basis for applying an act to a county of a particular population.
Failure to pass the "test" simply means that the court classifies the
population act, relating to a subject which under section 20 must be regulated by a "general" law, as a "special or local" law.
Typical of the recent cases was one in which a 1957 statute,2 47 establishing salary scales for county sheriffs, was held to be a forbidden "local"
law. 248 The statute provided forty different population categories, ranging
from "0 - 3445" (which included four counties) to "400,001 - and up"
(Dade County). The population categories were fairly complex; for
example, Putnam County fell in the category of "23,501 - 23,650" and its
sheriff's salary was fixed at 7500 dollars. To further complicate the law,
some eighteen counties were excepted from the act's application under
fourteen more population categories; for example, the act did not apply
-245.-42.1 So.2d at 793.
246. E.g., Greene v. Gray, 87 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1956) (the statute can apply to only

one local government and survive).
247. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-368,
248. Shelton v. Reeder, 121 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1960) (article III, § 21 at issue also).
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to Liberty County ("Not less than 3000 nor more than 3300"). The
intent of the legislature was to abolish the fee system of compensation by
a general law establishing a comprehensive salary scale for the sheriffs
under the act. If the law be a "general" one, it was valid under section
20; if a "special or local" law, it was invalid. To invalidate a law as not
"general" in nature, it is necessary for the law's antagonist to prove that
the population categories are "arbitrary," in the sense that there is no
'reasonable basis" for the law's application to one population category
and not to another. A law may be "general" even if it only applies to a
single local government if there is some sensible rationale for such limited
2 41
application. The court found the law invalid for a variety of reasons.
The most significant factor would seem to be that of the salary scales.
Santa Rosa's (category "18,501 - 20,000") sheriff received 11,000 dollars
while Broward's (category "80,001 - 100,000") sheriff received only 10,500
dollars. Further, if certain counties grew in population, hence moved into
a new category, their sheriff's salaries would be reduced. The legislative
intent appeared to be to "bless" certain sheriffs with salary "privileges"
unrelated to the complexity of their office work. The court invalidated
the law by characterizing it as a "local law passed under the guise of a
general act."
III. ARTICLE III, SECTION 21
This section states:
In all cases enumerated in the preceding Section [Section 20], all
laws shall be general and of uniform operation . . . but in all
cases not enumerated [in Section 20] . . . the Legislature may
pass special or local laws . . . PROVIDED that no local or special
bill shall be passed . . . unless notice of intention to apply therefore shall have been published in the manner provided . . . . PROVIDED, however, no publication of any such law shall be required
hereunder when such law contains a provision to the effect that
the same shall not become operative . . . until ratified or approved
at a referendum election . . . in the territory affected ....
A statute may be invalid under both sections 20 and 21. Section 20
requires the legislature to not pass special or local laws on any of the
subjects enumerated. Therefore, if the court determines that a statute is
not a general law, and it is on a subject listed under section 20, th e statute
is invalid. Under section 21 all laws must be general and of uniform
application, if on a subject enumerated in section 20, but on subjects not
so enumerated the legislature may pass local laws, provided that the notice
or referendum requirements of section 21 are met. A statute may neces249. For example, eighteen of the state's sixty-seven counties were excluded froni
the act's operation by "narrow population brackets" equivalent to "specifically naming"
the counties.

1962]

TRENDS IN FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

741

sarily be required to be characterized as a general law, under section 21,
if no notice of publication is given nor any referendum called for in the
statute. On the other hand, under section 20 the court may characterize
the statute as a local or special law on a prohibited subject matter.
Shelton v. Reeder,250 discussed in the preceding section, exemplifies
this dilemma. Under section 21, since neither referendum nor notice was
required by the statute, the court was forced to treat the law as a general
law. Then, under section 20, the court found that the law was not a
general law, but a local one. Apparently, the law was in violation of both
sections 20 and 21 of article III.
FALLS FROM CONSTITUTIONAL GRACE
As early as 1954251 it was suggested that at times Florida courts were
not utilizing judicial self-restraint in their decisions. Further, that the
hard-won presumptions of legislative correctness and validity are valuable
since so much of constitutional law is relatively a subjective area reflecting
the judge's personality, economic philosophy and background. 252
In a modern state the police power, restricted under substantive due
process to problems of health, safety and morals, is a poor thing. Refusal
to grant constitutional security to legislative classifications, under the vague
judicial test of the equal protection inhibitions, creates a parallel barrier
to modern legislative efforts. Finally, it can be said with some degree of
certainty that judicial manipulation of the "public purpose" doctrine,
creating yet another wall against social legislation, needlessly cripples
Florida legislative endeavors to solve Florida's problems. The judges and
justices of our Florida courts, who without doubt favorably view state,
as opposed to federal, solutions to Florida's problems, apparently lay the
groundwork for substantial federal law entree, when they inhibit our own
legislature's program. 25 3 To illustrate some of the preceding thoughts,
let us look at three decisions of Florida courts during the present Survey
period.
Moore v. Thompson2 54 is an impressive example.
250. Note 248 supra.

From the flow of

251. See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 8 MIAMI L. Q. 158, 175 (1954).
252. See Ribble, Some Aspects of Judicial Self-Restraint, 26 VA. L. REv. 981 (1940)
(a review of a change in judicial attitudes).
253. Resistance of judges to a modern role for labor led to the national labor acts,
and the county poor house is now generally replaced by national bureaucracy and expenditure. Other examples-roads, anti-trust and so on-can be multiplied almost endlessly. A
review of state and federal court antipathy to modern social legislation can be found in
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
After all, the national government has the constitutional power to insist on a uniform
day of rest, that drug stores be monitored by licensed pharmacists or that localities with
sluggish economies be brought in line with more fortunate areas. The authors, however,
believe that a local solution i§ preferable.
254. 126 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1961).
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constitutional decisions of our Florida courts, dealing with blue laws, one
can easily state that it simply is not possible to write a constitutional blue
law in this state. This is an accurate statement, taken from the standpoint of the substantive due process limitation or from that of equal protection. What more can the legislature do? Legislative findings of fact
were portrayed in the last statute. Our blue laws have not been particularly "unreasonable" or "arbitrary," since courts in the United States,
elsewhere, have generally validated similar acts.
Similar in import is State v. Leone.25 r Here, too, the promised presumption of validity had only theoretical value. Here, instead of equal
protection and utilizing a standard of the "reasonableness" of the classification created by the legislature, the court used substantive due process
to strike down a statute. The statutory requirement that retail drug
establishments be under the supervision of a licensed pharmacist does not
on its face, at least to these laymen, look "unreasonable." Clever arguments of counsel for business can always be drawn. It is the purpose of
the presumption of validity to overcome such "clever" arguments, unless
the regulation be clearly "arbitrary" (for example, perhaps, requiring a
doctor to supervise drug stores).
Let us examine the language of the supreme court in this case: "The
limitation [substantive due process] is such that the police power may only
be used so as to interfere with the God-given and constitutionally protected
right of the individual to pursue a lawful business . ..where the public
interest demands that the rights of the individual, or class, give way in
favor of the public generally." More of this: "To exercise this power
[police power] to the detriment of the individual or class, it must first be
clear that the purpose to be served is not merely desirable but one which
will so benefit the public as to justify interference with or destruction of
private rights." And again: "[T]he interference with or sacrifice of the
private rights must be necessary, i.e. must be essential, to the reasonable
accomplishment of the desired goal." Perhaps the final blow, and the
authors are still quoting, was this language: "If there is a choice of ways
in which government can reasonably obtain a valid goal necessary to the
public interest, it must elect that course which will infringe the least upon
the rights of the individual. '2'6 The language, in this case, is something
of an unusual combination of Bentham, Spencer, Smith and, perhaps,
others. It is reminiscent of language in opinions of the United States
Supreme Court 257 at the turn of the century and for some time thereafter.
It is not language which grants life to the presumption of validity.

255. 118 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1960).
256. Id. at 784-85.
257. See Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE

CONSTIrTUTION

(1942)

book on the relationship between philosophy, briefs and opinions).

(a

fascinating little
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The third decison in our chamber of relics is State v. Suwannee County
Dev. Authority.258

The requirement of Florida constitutional law that the

state, counties and cities spend, tax, borrow and so on within the "public
purpose" is particularly invidious. The abstraction, "public purpose,"
enjoys the same possibilities of personal discretion, from the point of view
of the deciding judges, as the words "reasonable" or "arbitrary," the tests
for compliance with substantive due process and equal protection in
Florida.
The public purpose doctrine had its inception relatively early in constitutional law in the United States. 25

1
1

It is generally pass6 in modern

constitutional law. Why should not a county be able to sell bonds, the
proceeds from the sale to be used to lure industry for the county's economic
development? One needs only to read the dissent of Justice Terrell to
understand the necessity of such economic programs. It might be instructive to quote from Justice Terrell's dissenting opinion:
Casual reading of [the law] . . . discloses that its dominant pur-

pose was to restore the delleted economy and general welfare of
Suwannee County .

. .

. It is appropriate to point out that at the

turn of the century, the economy of Suwannee County was flourishing. It had good farming lands that produced stable crops
and a large amount of Sea Island cotton. It had other lands that
produced pine and hardwood timber.
Much of the land that produced the pine forests is now what

is generally known as 'cut-over lands,' grown up in scrub pine and
scrub oak .

. .

. [T]he economy of the county is so depleted that

the young people grow up, leave for other parts to reside and
better their condition and many of the farming class and other
workers seek employment miles from home to supplement their
subsistence. On the whole the population has shown a gradual
decrease at each succeeding census, all of which presents a very
discouraging economic picture.
With the proceeds of the certificates, appellee [county] hopes

to remove some of the gloom from this picture ....

260

It is difficult to be sanguine about such decisions, but, from time to
time, our supreme court does shift a particular constitutional barrier to
state development. Lawyers' briefs may be of advantage in this connection. A demonstration that courts elsewhere have generally taken a position
inconsistent with that of the Florida court may have a dramatic, effect

258. 122 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1960).
259. See MOTT, DuE PROCESS OF LAw 434-537
varieties of "public purpose").

260. 122 So.2d at 196.

(1926)

(development

of the
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Ingenuity in designing brief arguments may also

For example, some of the constitutional issues the court

decides have remarkable economic side effects.2 2 The court is a Florida
institution and information of this nature should be very useful to its
members.

261. Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959), exemplifies
this very well.
262. State v. Suwannee County Dev. Authority, suPra note 258, exemplifies this.
See Miami Herald, Aug. 20, 1962, § B, p. 1, col. 6: "The Council on Economic Development was told Sunday that Florida's industry-hungry communities should be allowed to
use public money to attract ncw plants. . . . Florida is at a disadvantage because of the
financial inducements provided by governmental bodies in nearby states . . . and a
'judicious use' of local subsidies is requircd to meet the competition. . . . Alabama,
Mississippi, Georgia and South Carolina all have laws permitting general obligation or
revenue bonds to build industrial facilities, Pennsylvania and New York offer both state
and local aid. All this adds up to stiff competition for Florida and makes firms hesitant
to move to Florida if they can serve its markets from their present locations. A danger in
the lack of local government assistance to economic development . . . is the movement
toward federal financial aid to fill the gap, which usually carries with it loss of local control."

